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BRITAIN, THE COMMONWEALTH and EUROPEAN INTEGRATION¹

J. D. B. MILLER

The author, an Australian, formerly
at the University of Sydney, is now
Professor of Politics at the Univer-
sity of Leicester.

Where away England, steersman answer me?
We cannot tell. For we are all at sea.

*She is the wandering Dutchman, the pilgrim and scapegoat of the world.
Which flings its sins upon her as the old world heaped its sins on the
friars.*

(Joyce Cary, *To be a Pilgrim*, ch. 155)

MY TASK is to try to explain why Britain has shown so little enthusiasm for European integration, and, in particular, what part has been played by her Commonwealth connections in deciding her approach to this question. I use the word 'integration' to mean a condition of organic union, or of federal connection, or of supranational control, rather than of alliance or co-operation. The European Coal and Steel Community and the European Economic Community are examples of integration; the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation is not. It would be impossible to defend this distinction against all the attacks which might be brought against it by logicians, but it is well enough understood by those who have written and talked about European Union or the European Idea in the past decade. It has been one of the principal complaints of the proponents of European Union that Britain, under both Labour and Conservative governments, has refused to enter into any arrangement which postulated integration as its end. The British have been prepared to co-operate in military, economic and even cultural arrangements, but they have not been prepared to subordinate their national policy to any supra-national body. Why have they not? Is it because they have not been prepared to put Europe before the Commonwealth, as is often suggested? Or are there other reasons?

1. This article contains the substance of a paper read to the Annual Conference of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom at Durham in March, 1958. I have made slight changes in wording and added some references to the discussion on the paper, but it remains very much as it was read.

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Such an inquiry is not easy, because, while it is hard enough to say what motives made a government do something, it is even harder to say what motives made it *not* do something. Yet, if we are to make sense of politics, we must often try to analyse motives which lead to inaction. It is impossible to be precise in speculating about these, but we can bring forward theories about them, to be tested against the evidence and against alternative theories. In this case we have a fact to be explained—the fact that Britain has stayed out of integration schemes in Europe, even though her government has been headed since 1951 by men who, between 1946 and 1951, seemed vociferous in support of the European Idea.

My method will be, first, to ask what we might expect the British attitude towards European integration to be, if Britain had no Commonwealth connections; and then to ask what effect those Commonwealth connections have. I shall proceed in this way in order to emphasise that the reasons for the British approach to integration are diverse and are not all connected with the Commonwealth of Nations.

If we look at the relations between Britain and Europe, without considering the Commonwealth, we can distinguish certain influences which might be expected to involve Britain closely in European affairs, and others which might be expected to have the opposite effect.

INFLUENCES LINKING BRITAIN AND EUROPE

The most obvious of the influences linking Britain with Europe are military. For Britain, the main battles of the last two wars have been fought in or (in the case of the Battles of Britain and the Atlantic) from Europe. Europe has been both the source of trouble and the place where the trouble was dealt with. Only a vast change in world affairs could make Britain uninterested in Europe from the military standpoint. The record of events shows that, since 1945, Britain's main military interest has been in European alliances—although, in each case, these have been alliances in which the USA has been either a participant or a benevolent observer. The Brussels Treaty, NATO, the Eden plan for British connection with EDC, and WEU, have all been alliances by means of which the British government strove for guarantees on the continent of Europe. The main aim has been to ensure that, if Britain were involved in war, she could meet her enemies on European battlefields with the help of her allies. This is a policy of prudence, in the light of past experience. But it does not necessarily involve any sense of identification with Europe.

Next come certain economic influences. In 1956 28% of British exports went to Western Europe. Most British exports of coal and petroleum products went there, as did something like a third of woollen goods and non-ferrous base metals. Import figures were not dissimilar. Western Europe is a significant source of foodstuffs, wood and its products, some machinery, and some chemicals; but only in bacon and wine is it obviously the leading source of supply. Commonwealth countries bulk larger in foodstuffs, and the USA in manufactured goods.¹ From a simple assessment of trading relationships, Europe is a marginal area for Britain: one which is not indispensable, but which, if it declined as a market, could cause considerable upheaval in sections of the British economy. It is as much a competitor as a complementary trading area. In the field of 'invisibles', however, the two areas are closely linked at such points as tourism and investment. The desire or lack of desire of European speculators to hold sterling is a constant bugbear to those who guard the British balance of payments: 'the little man in Zurich' is a prominent figure in all discussions of currency matters. In spite of his activities, it cannot be said that economic links bind Britain inextricably to Europe. Britain could be put to considerable embarrassment by the failure of her neighbours to co-operate with her; but, at a pinch, she could live without Europe, as she did between 1940 and 1945.

In sum, the military and economic links between Britain and Europe are strong, but are based upon geographical proximity, convenience and policy, rather than upon an obvious identity of either viewpoint or interests.

INFLUENCES SEPARATING BRITAIN FROM EUROPE

In military terms, the identification of Britain's interests with those of continental Europe makes sense only in the area of Western Europe, and in the context of an aggressive European power, such as Germany or Russia, which might be expected to seek a hold on the western coast and to menace the British Isles. In other parts of the world it does not fit the facts. In the Middle East and North Africa there is a considerable divergence of interests, whether they be viewed in the context of oil, cultural rivalry, trade or tradition. In Asia the kind of identification of interests which prevailed in the Boxer rebellion and in the setting up of the treaty ports in China no longer applies. No European country came to the aid of France in

1. See *Freer Trade in Europe, an Official Account* (HMSO, 1957), and *The Commonwealth and the Sterling Area, Statistical Abstract No. 77* (HMSO, 1957).

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Indochina or the Netherlands in Indonesia, and Britain was conspicuously unprepared to recognise an identity of interests in either case. In Africa south of the Sahara, where Britain is a colonial power in something like the same terms as France, Belgium and Portugal, there have been extensive discussions of possible military co-operation. But these have been vitiated by divergent colonial policies and by the unwelcome promptings of South Africa.

If we assume that British interests in the military field are identical with those of European countries only in respect of Western Europe itself, the aims of British policy become clearer. British military commitments are world-wide. They are difficult to meet in any situation in which Britain is hampered by external control of her military resources. If the British Army were part of a European Army, it would be harder to use it readily in such areas as the Persian Gulf, the Aden Protectorate, Kenya, Malaya and British Guiana; as things are, it cannot be deployed anywhere in a hurry, as the Suez operation showed. If to its logistic difficulties were added the difficulties of considering what were 'European' interests in these parts of the world, it might not be deployed at all. It is therefore not surprising that, while Britain has been prepared to promise to keep a minimum number of troops in Western Europe, and to accept the loose kind of control of her military forces which NATO exerts, she has always demanded full control of the disposal of her remaining forces. In any event, the defence of the British Isles is bound up, not only with co-operation with Europe, but also—and primarily—with close alliance with the USA. In British strategy, the American alliance comes before the European alliances. The growth of ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads makes this more evident and more urgent.

In economic terms there are various influences which separate Britain from Europe. As I have already shown, Europe is a marginal trading area. But it has other characteristics which render it a threat to British economic interests as those are understood by certain influential groups in Britain. With the exception of Scandinavia, Europe is, compared with Britain, a low-wage area. There is widespread fear amongst British manufacturers and trade unionists that in straight competition with European firms and workers they would find themselves undercut. Economists' demonstrations to the contrary have had little effect upon the doubts and fears of those British industries which do not already export to Europe. The cautious acceptance of the government's plans for a European Free Trade Area was the result of fear of the consequences of effective operation of the European Economic Community (the

Common Market), rather than of enthusiasm for a wider trading area as such. It was also consequent upon promises by the British government about full employment, foodstuffs, revenue duties, lack of harmonisation of social charges, and refusal to allow any supranational operation of the Free Trade Area.¹ Enthusiasm about the Free Trade Area was confined to commercial and financial interests, centred in the City, and to writers on economics and finance; it did not come from organisations of manufacturers or from trade unions. This fact was obscured by the chorus of approval of free trade measures which is characteristic of the non-Beaverbrook Press in Britain, and which gives, to the uninitiated observer, the impression that the country is heart and soul behind free trade.

In fact, Britain is a country pulled now towards protectionism, now towards free trade: there are solidly organised interest-groups which demand each of these policies, and sometimes both. Broadly speaking, the old-established manufactures want protection, as does agriculture; trade unions demand protection in all cases where jobs seem to be threatened by overseas competition, whether that competition comes from Europe, Asia or anywhere else. Some of the newer industries, along with trading, financial and commercial concerns, want free trade; they may be joined by the trade unions, in cases where no trade union interest is threatened and where unionists can be viewed as consumers, not producers. This conflict is essentially a political one, since each participant strives to influence government policy. But it is not usually publicised as a characteristic conflict of British politics, for two reasons.

The first is that the conflict goes on *within* the political parties, rather than *between* them. Officially, neither the Conservative nor the Labour Party is now directly and avowedly protectionist; in practice, both parties grant and sustain protection where it seems to be called for. Each of the two parties contains members who incline in ideology towards the two extremes of free trade and protection. The second reason is that, although there is something of a *political* tradition of protectionism in Britain, there is much less of a tradition of protectionist *economics*, such as one finds in Germany, the United States and Australia, stemming from the great work of Freidrich List. British economists, in my experience, are either liberals, who damn all protection at sight, or socialists, who insist that protection is unimportant alongside the larger ques-

1. See *A Joint Report on the European Free Trade Area*, produced by the Association of British Chambers of Commerce, Federation of British Industries, and National Union of Manufacturers (London, 1957); and, for the government's promises, Cmnd. 72.

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tion of the control of the means of production, etc. Thus, whenever protection appears as a policy, it is left to the politicians to defend; the economists will not speak up for it.¹ Furthermore, defiantly protectionist politicians seem to be much scarcer than they have been for almost a century; Chamberlains and Amerys are not to be found in the front ranks of the Conservative party. Thus, although protectionism is a brute fact of the British economy and of the relationship between the government and the economy, very little is said in justification of it, except by those who demand it in their own interests.

Protectionism is the major economic influence separating Britain from Europe. It operates both ways: not only do British producers fight shy of continental competition, but European countries also do not want free trade with Britain under conditions that might favour British producers. The Common Market is essentially a protectionist device; that is why it stirred up, so quickly, the British response of a Free Trade Area. European countries, especially France, are not prepared to come into a free trade area with Britain unless the particular advantages which Britain is assumed to possess (e.g., in the matter of social charges) are counteracted, and British freedom of action is curtailed by an over-riding 'European' political authority.²

In addition to protectionism, other economic influences operate against closer British connection with Europe. The fact that Britain is not part of the European mainland has incalculable economic effects. It encourages British self-sufficiency in a great many fields, especially transport. Britain's being an island has turned her economic face towards the United States, the Commonwealth countries and Latin America, rather than towards Europe: sea transport pushed Britain away from Europe, as land transport pushed the European countries towards each other, in spite of their individual efforts to become self-sufficient nations. The European Coal and Steel Community is, to a large extent, simply an elaboration of arrangements which were arrived at between the wars by European producers who shared sources of raw materials and markets. Even

1. A colleague who knows more about British economists than I do, says that Keynesian economics have made protectionism more respectable than it was in the 19th century: it can be invoked as a means to lessen unemployment or to induce a favourable movement in the terms of trade. In spite of this, I have left my argument as it stood in my original paper, because I have not seen any such invocations.

2. See, on this point, two particularly illuminating articles, by William Pickles, *Twentieth Century*, February, 1958, and Bertrand de Jouvenel, *Sunday Times*, 4th January, 1959.

if Britain had been prepared to enter ECSC, it would have been difficult to integrate her coal and steel industries with those of Europe; they had not been compatible in thinking, in practice, in markets or in working conditions with the continental industries. In the currency field similar considerations apply. Britain operates her own system of acting as banker to the sterling area; no European country is in a comparable position, and none aspires to be.

My point is that, in economic terms, the protectionism which has been a British characteristic since the 1930's has not created a totally new situation between Britain and Europe; rather, it has consolidated and strengthened the economic differences which arose from the fact that Britain, an island nation with its main interest in markets and investment opportunities overseas, did not fit into the pattern of economic give-and-take which became part of the accepted life of Europe.¹

However, the strongest influences separating Britain from Europe are, in my view, those of culture and ideas. It is true that, if one wishes, one can read history in such a way as to fit Britain into a framework of European cultural unity. This can be done by stressing such common historical experiences as the spread of the Roman Empire, the assumption of Christianity, the common factor of feudalism, the New Learning, the Reformation, the common search for overseas possessions, the Enlightenment, and so on. All of this is relevant if one wishes to compare European civilisation in the broadest sense with, say, Chinese civilisation. But it is less relevant when we consider the relations of European countries with one another, and much less relevant when we consider the relation of British culture and ideas to those of continental Europe. While it is true that Europeans tend to stress their common background when faced by hostile Asians and Africans, it is also true that, *faced by one another*, they fall apart. The case of France and Germany is only the most obvious of a number of similar antipathies in Europe, where nations refuse to co-operate except temporarily in conditions of great stress.

But none of these continental divisions has anything like the force of the division between Britain and continental Europe as a whole.

1. In saying this, I do not ignore the fact that France and Germany pursued strongly protectionist policies throughout their period of industrialisation. No doubt this protectionism reduced the degree of give-and-take which might otherwise have prevailed in Europe; but it did not prevent certain natural economies from expressing themselves. In any case, a good deal of the give-and-take, as in steel, took place *after* the national industries had been built up by individual protectionism by particular countries.

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Frenchmen and Germans, however much they differ, still find it natural to call themselves Europeans; British people do not, and in fact never call themselves Europeans except when involved in some racial clash, far away from Europe, in such places as Malaya or South Africa. To most British people, foreigners begin at Calais. Europeans do not speak English. They do not eat the same food as British people, or drink the same drinks. Their social customs are unintelligible, many of them are dirty, and their religions bear little relation to propriety as that is understood in Britain. They are, in fact, foreigners. Other peoples, farther away, are not foreigners. Americans are not foreigners in anything like the same sense, since they speak English. Even coloured people are not foreigners in the same sense; they probably speak English too. The whole of Europe is foreign, though its Nordic fringes are allowed a certain similarity to Britain. Apart from this concession, British people of every class seem to me to stress the differences between their culture and the cultures of Europe, and to pre-suppose the superiority of their own to a point where they admit no need to understand continental views and standards. The cultural differences are growing rather than diminishing. It would be difficult to find a public man in Britain who could show the same acquaintance, and the same sense of sympathy, with European cultures as did Milton, Gladstone and Matthew Arnold in their various ways. The replacement of the Grand Tour by the Cook's Tour does not bring greater comprehension of foreign countries; it brings less, but to many more people. The upshot is that British people accept Australians, Canadians, Irishmen and even Americans as somehow not 'foreign', though they may come from thousands of miles away, while regarding the Frenchman, who lives closer to London than the Scotsman or the Northern Irishman, as incontestably foreign.

Such an attitude on the part of the man in the street might not matter if the intellectuals of Britain were in close sympathy with their counterparts on the continent. But this is not the case. In the field best known to me, that of political study, British intellectuals alternately deplore and find incomprehensible the behaviour and thought of Europeans. The same is true in philosophy. It is less true in some of the arts, and much less true in the sciences. Even so, it is fair to say that the set of the British mind is contrary to that of the continental mind, whether the continental mind expresses itself in Cartesian, Hegelian, Thomist, Existentialist or Marxist terms. British intellectuals usually defend their isolation by saying that they are empiricist, whereas Europeans are apriorist. Whether

this is true or not is hardly germane to the issue: the fact that British intellectuals *think* that this gap exists, and are determined not to step over it, is sufficient to maintain British intellectual isolation.¹

BRITAIN vs. EUROPE: A SUMMARY

If my diagnosis is correct, we can say that, even when the Commonwealth is left out of account, the forces pulling Britain away from integration with Europe are likely to be stronger than those urging her towards it. The strongest pro-integration forces are military, but, even so, they suggest nothing more than alliance as a prudent policy. In economics there is no such set of common interests between Britain and Europe as brought the Benelux countries together. Europe is a collection of competitors with Britain, and, insofar as Europe is a partner, she is one whom Britain can do without at a pinch. In culture and ideas there is little contact of a dynamic and effective kind: Britain is intermittently curious about what is going on in Europe, but rarely succumbs to European influences except in the arts—and hardly at all in the most characteristic and important of the arts in Britain, that of literature. If Europe did not exist, it would not be necessary to invent it.

COMMONWEALTH APPROACHES TO EUROPE

We can now attempt to estimate the influence of the Commonwealth upon the British approach to European integration. To do this we must first look at the attitudes of the Commonwealth countries themselves towards Europe, and at those of their interests which might be affected by Britain being integrated into Europe. This is a matter hedged about with a great many misconceptions, most of which arise from the erroneous assumption that the Commonwealth countries' interests in regard to Europe are exclusively economic. I propose, therefore, to consider economic interests first, and then to indicate the importance of non-economic interests in this connection.

The Commonwealth countries have no obvious set of common economic interests, in spite of the existence of imperial preference and the sterling area. Commonwealth countries are mostly com-

1. This section on culture and ideas provoked the most discussion when the paper was read. It was suggested that continental influences were stronger in Britain in some of the arts (notably the drama and the visual arts) than I had implied. But there was general agreement that in politics and philosophy the gap between Britain and the continent was considerable. Only a few of the political scientists present thought of themselves as Europeans.

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petitors with one another. Imperial preference is a marginal advantage to most of them. The greater part of their principal exports, such as gold, wool, wheat, metals, rubber, get no preference at all. Preference matters most to some colonial territories, such as the West Indies and the Rhodesias, which produce commodities in heavy world supply, such as sugar and tobacco, which can benefit from a small preference in the British market. It also matters to New Zealand in dairy products (though it has been a sad disappointment in regard to butter), to South Africa and Australia in fruit, wine and certain other products, and to India in cotton goods. Its total effect on Commonwealth trade, however, is small; the countries to which it matters most are the smallest in the Commonwealth. Moreover, even these countries have other markets and products to which preference does not apply. The general reluctance to extend the preference system is not due solely to the complications of GATT. It stems also from a widespread conviction amongst Commonwealth countries that the disadvantages of extension would outweigh the advantages. Preference was adopted as a panic measure in the depression, was never wholly congenial to Britain, and does not sort with the determination of all Commonwealth countries to become as self-sufficient as they can. We may say that there is something of a general Commonwealth interest in maintaining present preferences, but not in increasing them. Even the present level of preference would be quickly sacrificed if individual Commonwealth members saw advantage elsewhere.

Similarly, the sterling area provides something of a common interest amongst Commonwealth countries (except Canada), but it is little more than a marriage of convenience. Its existence depends more upon Britain's capacity to find investment funds for the overseas members than upon any general community of interests. Membership of the area does not impose particular trading policies upon the countries concerned, although it does have the effect of restricting the dollar spending of some which might otherwise be able to buy more from North America; these are in the minority, since the majority of members would find their dollar spending even more restricted than it is now, if they had to conduct unilateral trade with North America.

So far as Europe is concerned, the interest which the Commonwealth has by virtue of the sterling area is insignificant. The sterling area is not connected specifically with Europe, except through Britain's membership of EPU and the arrangements between central banks which have succeeded EPU. By these means Britain backs

the spending of Commonwealth money on European goods. Unless Britain entered a scheme of European integration which made each European country concentrate its investment within Europe, the sterling area could continue in being, and the Commonwealth countries would experience no disturbance, so long as the British balance of payments remained steady and Britain continued to have investible funds to use overseas. Imperial preference is a more serious matter in regard to Europe, since European countries and their dependencies are in some cases competitors with Commonwealth producers who receive a small preference in the British market. Anything which nullified this preference, without providing compensating advantages, would be opposed by most Commonwealth countries.

The economic interests which Commonwealth countries have in regard to Europe can be seen at work in their approaches to the discussions about the Common Market and Free Trade Area.¹ The Commonwealth Finance Ministers, meeting at Mont Tremblant in 1957, welcomed the British initiative for a Free Trade Area, and noted the determination of Britain to safeguard Commonwealth interests in the British markets for foodstuffs, drink and tobacco. Their approval of a Free Trade Area was expressed immediately after their comment that they had reviewed the progress of the Common Market Treaty and its effect on the interests of their countries.² It was plain that they thought the Free Trade Area the lesser of two evils: while it might mean increased competition for some of their exports to Britain, they were promised that preferences on food, drink and tobacco would be retained; and the alternative was a Common Market, from which their own goods were excluded, from which Britain was excluded, and which might weaken Britain as a customer for their exports. They were not concerned with the fact that it was *Europe* in which all this was happening; it might as well have been South America. They were entirely concerned with calculations of trading advantage; and the same would apply to any other European scheme in which Britain might become involved.

In the non-economic sphere, a variety of Commonwealth approaches to Europe can be traced. These must all be taken into account by any British government contemplating entry into some form of political integration with Europe.

Of all the Commonwealth countries, South Africa is probably the most enthusiastic about British integration with Europe. The quarrels

1. On this, see Frank Holmes, *International Affairs*, January, 1958.

2. Communiqué, 1st October, 1957.

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between white South Africans might be less angry if British citizenship were interchangeable with Dutch, French and German. The objectives of South African native policy might be more readily achieved, and made more respectable, if Britain, France, Portugal and Belgium were included in a single political unit, however loose; these are all colonial powers whose borders march with South Africa's or with one another's, and it is the main aim of South Africa's foreign policy to co-ordinate their native policies with hers and to safeguard white supremacy in South Africa by enlisting them in a single defence body for Africa south of the Sahara. So far, France, Belgium and Portugal have been sympathetic, but Britain lukewarm. The main stumbling-block, apart from British delicacy about the High Commission Territories, has been the use of black troops: the other countries want to use them, whereas South Africa fears that to put arms into the hands of her own natives would be to invite rebellion. But there is little doubt that South Africa would benefit from greater British integration with Europe, since this would bring Britain into closer collaboration with countries whose native policies are closer to South Africa's than to her own.

In contrast with South Africa's interest in European integration one may take India's, which is quite the opposite. Indian official opinion has been suspicious of NATO, since it considers that the North Atlantic Treaty might enable Portugal to ask Britain for help in defending Goa, and the Netherlands to demand such help in retaining West New Guinea. The closer the association between Britain on the one hand, and France, the Netherlands, Belgium and Portugal on the other, the more suspicious India is likely to be of British colonial policy. It would then be possible to argue that British policy in such areas as East Africa was capable of being affected by the divergent aims of these other countries; indeed, if integration were really thorough, as most proponents of the European Idea wish it to be, colonial policy could hardly remain national but would presumably be decided, along with foreign policy, by the supra-national European organisation. In such a case, not only India, but also Ghana, Ceylon, Malaya and perhaps Pakistan would lose what faith they have now in the British devotion to self-government for colonies. They would argue—with much cogency—that the pace of the European colonial convoy on its way towards independence would be that of the slowest member, and that Britain would have to moderate her pace to the snail-like progress of Belgium and Portugal. There might be a reversal of the present Indian policy of discouraging Indians in existing British colonies from looking to India for guidance. There would be great hubbub in Nigeria and

the East African colonies, where the British promise of eventual self-government would be regarded as prejudiced by Britain's new associations. The present uneasy alliance with Pakistan, in SEATO and the Bagdad Pact, might be strained to breaking-point. In short, it is likely that closer British integration in Europe would prove intensely unpopular in the Asian and African countries of the Commonwealth.

The attitudes of Canada, Australia and New Zealand might be expected to come somewhere in between those of South Africa and the other countries which I have just mentioned. In Canada there would be a basic interest in closer British connection with Europe, since Canada's voting population, like South Africa's, has a majority of people of continental European descent. There would also be a strong feeling that the Atlantic association, by which Canada sets such great store, was being further cemented. But there would also be considerable doubt about the wisdom of alienating the Asian members of the Commonwealth, with whom Canadian associations have been so close in the past ten years or so. Presumably something would depend upon whether Canada had a Liberal or Conservative government at the time.

New Zealand could be expected to approve whatever arrangements with Europe were proposed by a British government; but Australian attitudes, like those of Canada, would depend to some extent upon the sort of government in office. In either case, they would be the product of mixed feelings. Australia has a strong interest in keeping the Dutch strong, since a strong Netherlands with a determination to hold on to West New Guinea means a temporary solution of the awkward problem of whether Australia could permanently live at peace in New Guinea with Indonesia. At the same time, Australia has to live with Asia, in which anti-colonialist countries predominate. The policy of both major parties in Australia is to woo Asian countries, especially those which are members of the Commonwealth. If British integration in Europe proved to be as destructive of Indian, Ceylonese and Malayan trust in British colonial intentions as I have suggested above, this result could hardly prove satisfactory for Australia. On balance, I think Australian advice would be against British integration with Europe, on account of the effects on Asian opinion; but much would depend on whether the advice was to come from Mr. Menzies or Dr. Evatt.

These divergent Commonwealth approaches to Europe are reflections of the fact that each Commonwealth member is a sovereign state with its own way to make in the world. To some members of the Commonwealth, Europe is the home of colonialism and imperial-

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ism, and as such to be suspected of the worst motives. To others, Europe is a series of fatherlands. To others again, it is where 'foreigners' come from, as it is to the British. But to all it is both an element in past history and an element in present strategy and political alignments. Each Commonwealth member may thus be expected to have a different approach to Europe, depending on how its attitudes have been swayed by the combination of past hatreds or affections with contemporary calculation of the policy which will best suit national interests. Amongst those interests, the economic will feature, but will not be likely to prove the most important.

COMMONWEALTH EFFECTS ON THE BRITISH APPROACH TO INTEGRATION

In general, no British government since 1945 has been prepared to carry out external policies which met with the active disapproval of major states in the Commonwealth, especially Canada and India. The one exception was the Suez venture; and it is fair to assume that the strenuous efforts of Sir Anthony Eden's successor to soothe the Commonwealth members who opposed that venture are indications that Suez was an exception and is meant to remain so. The general principle of proceeding in harmony with Commonwealth opinion applies, whether one looks at British policy in Asia, the Middle East, the United Nations, or the colonial territories. It is true that there have been differences of opinion with Canada over finance, with India over SEATO and the Bagdad Pact, and with Australia over China. But these differences have proved remarkably amicable, and have been accompanied by constant assurances from Britain that Commonwealth views were being respected and would be deferred to wherever possible. Britain devotes more effort than any other member of the Commonwealth to emphasising to the world the remarkable character of the Commonwealth, the uniqueness of its multi-racial membership, and its function as a 'bridge' between East and West. I think it is reasonable to conclude that British governments, irrespective of party, consider that Britain gains extra stature from being the senior partner in the Commonwealth, and that they will go to great lengths to accommodate their policies to the strongly expressed views of other Commonwealth members. It is also reasonable to assume that the opinions of Asian and African members carry special weight. This is because the retention of Commonwealth membership by these countries is what gives the Commonwealth its unique character as an association of a great

power and its ex-dependencies, and because the degree of trust in Britain shown by these countries is an assurance to present dependencies that they too will become free.

Given the situation which I have just outlined, it is possible to suggest where lies the main force of Commonwealth influence on Britain in regard to European integration. It lies, not in the rather flimsy common interest which Commonwealth members have in imperial preference, but in the weight of ex-colonial opinion directed against France and Portugal in particular, and against European colonialism in general. Even if this weight were not felt in the Foreign Office (though it is), it would be overwhelmingly felt in the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices. If Britain were now part of an integrated Europe, Algeria would be the albatross round her neck. To avoid the taint of other people's colonialism has been a constant theme in British postwar policy, from the initial confusions in Indonesia and Indochina until the present. It is hard to believe that any British government which valued Commonwealth opinion, and, in particular, the presence in the Commonwealth of Asian and Black African states, would seriously consider union with the colonial countries of Europe.

SUMMARY

I suggested, before considering the Commonwealth effect upon British policy, that the forces pulling Britain away from Europe were, in any case, stronger than those urging her towards it. If there were no Commonwealth, I think British politicians would still hesitate before contemplating integration with Europe; it is hard to see how Britain could generate the force of opinion which might impel her to take such a step, except in the most extreme danger. As things stand, it is most unlikely, especially when one takes into account the extent to which British governments look to the USA, not to Europe, for military help.¹ Otherwise, the influences of economic protectionism and cultural insularity would suffice to keep Britain separate.

When one adds to the other influences drawing Britain away from Europe the fact that the Commonwealth, on the whole, is likely to be doubtful or hostile about European integration, it is easy to see why British governments have shown such slight enthusiasm

1. In this connection, it was suggested in discussion that another major reason why Britain has been reluctant to enter a European Union is the determination of the Foreign Office (and the politicians) to foster the notion of Britain as an equal partner with the USA. If Britain were part of Europe, Europe would be the partner. I think there is a great deal in this.

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for full-blooded integration. When it has been necessary to effect some large change in Europe, such as the re-armament of Western Germany, Britain has made encouraging noises about the European Idea. But, once these immediate needs have been met, there has been no British follow-through; and it is not to be expected that any will occur in the future.

WHAT WE KNOW AND DON'T KNOW ABOUT CHINA

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THE MAO-KHRUSHCHEV MEETING and the recent increase in military activity over Quemoy and Matsu are reminders of the importance of China in international affairs. The former has produced a good deal of speculation about the relative importance of Peking and Moscow in determining international Communist policy. The latter is a reminder that the Chinese People's Government has by far the largest military forces of any Asian power.

But, while the international importance of China has increased, information about China has decreased. Up to 1949 the United States was very well informed. There were a number of very able and experienced newspaper correspondents, there were close contacts at the official level, and many American scholars were working in China. How far all this information was correctly interpreted is still a controversial question, but the raw material for a reasoned judgment about China was certainly available. Since 1949 direct contacts between the United States and mainland China have practically disappeared.

We do know a great deal about the background, both material and historical. Geographically, China is about the same size as the United States and extends rather further both northwards and southwards. The Western, Central Asian part of the country is mostly mountain or desert and over 95% of the people live in about 40% of the area within which population is very dense. The census of 1953 put the total population of mainland China at 582 million. A very high proportion are peasant farmers; cultivated land averages less than half an acre per head of population; and the possibilities of extending cultivation are limited. The basic natural resources for industrialisation, such as coal and iron ore, are considerable though much less than those of the United States; and up to 1949, industrial development was limited.

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A great deal could be done in developing an industrialized economy though it is unlikely that China could become an industrial power on the same scale as the U.S.A. or the U.S.S.R.

In the long run the basic economic problem is population. The rate of increase is officially given as 2% per annum and may be even higher. This would double the population in less than 40 years and even though a considerable increase in food production is possible, mainly by raising the yield per acre, it is doubtful whether China could feed 1,200,000,000 people. Even now population pressure is a serious obstacle to raising the general standard of living.

The historical background to Communist rule was a period in which the traditional Chinese society had broken down under the impact of Western culture. Up to the middle of the eighteenth century most Western observers were impressed by Chinese material civilization and Chinese standards of administration. Observers from the changed Western world of a hundred years later, which had developed superior technology and superior powers of organisation, mostly considered China to be backward materially and badly governed.

The traditional Chinese society had developed on a very different pattern from that of Western society. Power and wealth depended, not on property, but on position in the imperial bureaucracy and the ruling group was held together by a common indoctrination in the official ideology of Confucianism. Whereas Japan was able to meet the challenge of the West by taking over a great deal of Western culture, the Chinese ruling group found it impossible to make the necessary adjustments without destroying the system on which its power depended. The fall of the empire in 1911 was followed by a period of confusion with almost continual civil wars. When, in the 1930's, the Kuomintang government was starting to produce some stability and progress its efforts were diverted by Japanese pressure. For China, World War II started in 1937 and V-J Day was only the prelude to a large scale civil war which ended with the Communist victory on the mainland in 1949.

On the long term view, the Communists succeeded because the democratic powers failed to support the democratic forces in China—the Western Powers were inclined to back first Yuan Shih-kai and later the war-lords rather than Sun Yat-sen—and failed to provide an adequate ideology for handling the problems of Chinese society. Many Chinese wanted a democratic system but had no clear programme for building one on the foundation available in China. It proved futile, for example, to introduce an excellent system of Westernized law when anyone with military

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force behind him could defy the law. The Communist ideas of One Party Rule and Democratic Centralism were accepted as a means of getting something done.

Under more favourable conditions the Kuomintang, in which democratic influences were strong, might have produced a workable system; but, after 1937, the Kuomintang lost its chance by concentrating on opposing the Communists rather than on competing with them. Many people on Taiwan will now say that the Communists would never have won if the Kuomintang had put through on the mainland the agrarian and political reforms which have now been carried out in Taiwan. And this could have been done if the determination at high levels had been there. In fact, the Communists came to power in a country disorganised by twelve years of large scale war and civil war in which the old government had become demoralized and lost public confidence. It is the system which they have developed since 1949 which we need to understand.

There are two main sources of information about present day China, the Chinese press and the reports of visitors to China. The Chinese press is completely controlled by the government and is avowedly propagandist. (An editor would indignantly repudiate a suggestion that his publication was giving objective reports of the situation.) What it says can seldom be taken at its face value. Nevertheless it does provide a lot of information. The difficulty is that to get this information requires work and a good deal of skill and experience. Economic information often depends on putting together separate items. For example, given the number of trade union members, total of trade union dues, and the fact that dues were 1% of wages one could deduce an average wage rate. To obtain political information one needs skill at catching hints given in Communist jargon and what is not said is often as important as what is said. For example, one can sometimes deduce a disagreement within the Communist leadership from the fact that some leaders avoid any mention of a policy which others are supporting.

One has to be prepared to wait for information. One extra fact may make a whole set of deductions possible. A self criticism campaign or shift in the Party Line may suddenly produce quite detailed reports in fields where previous evidence had been very indirect and inadequate.

Much work is being done on the Chinese press and the American Consulate-General in Hongkong gives very valuable assistance by producing an English translation service, though it does not publish its deductions from this material. There are also some good private

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research organisations in Hongkong, such as the Union Research Service, which do publish their evaluations.

Unfortunately, comparatively little of this information finds its way into the daily papers. To get it one has to go to books or articles in serious journals. The press in the Western world is mostly more interested in stories than in news and seldom allows a correspondent to become a research worker producing serious feature articles at irregular intervals.

In the early years of the regime one could get reports from foreigners leaving China and, since 1954, a considerable number of foreign visitors have been admitted, including many correspondents, though admission to mainland China has become much more restricted during 1958. Some reports by these visitors have been very valuable though the French and the Japanese seem to have made better use of their opportunities than the British. It is fascinating to see how much a good correspondent can get in a country about which he has no background knowledge and in which he is entirely dependent on official interpreters, but one often wants to say, 'If only the paper which was prepared to spend thousands of dollars in sending a man to China had been prepared to spend a few hundred on giving him enough background briefing to ask the important questions . . .'

In the early years of Communist rule there was evidence of a considerable degree of support for the regime, especially among the intellectuals who have an influence quite out of proportion to their numbers in all Asian countries and even more in China where the scholar officials were the traditional ruling group. Some of this support came from the real accomplishments of the regime and one could generalise by saying that the Communists did a very good job in those fields for which their Communist theory was irrelevant. There were things which obviously needed to be done—the restoration of industry and transport, development of flood control and irrigation schemes, stabilization of the currency, public health work, and so on. All these were subjects about which Communist theory has little or nothing to say and the Communist leaders were prepared to use their common sense and to give the people with expert knowledge a backing they had not usually received under previous regimes. Support also came from national pride, a feeling that the Communist regime had at last restored China to the status of a great power. And many people were impressed by the Communist promises of a new and better society.

Some of the most interesting developments of the past two years have been those which show that a large part of this early support

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has now been lost. As in other Communist ruled countries the regime became more liberal after the death of Stalin and by 1956 seemed to have moved further from Stalinism than Russia. Initially the Chinese press even commented favourably on the Hungarian revolt though it suddenly changed its line on the day after the Soviet ambassador had had a conference with Chou En-lai. Internally liberalization continued and for a time in the first half of 1957 a surprising degree of free criticism was allowed and even encouraged.

There is some evidence that opinions were divided on the Central Committee about the wisdom of this policy and that Mao Tse-tung's views in favour of it were decisive. It seems likely that Mao had genuinely misjudged the situation and thought that freedom would only produce the kind of moderate criticism which the regime could accept and which would actually be helpful to it. Perhaps Mao and some other leaders should be given credit for hoping that they could have a Communist regime based on popular support.

In fact, the period of freedom produced a flood of very fundamental criticism, not only from non-Party intellectuals but also from many Communist Party members. The most general point of criticism was that the Communist Party was degenerating into a new privileged ruling group. Some critics went so far as to compare the position of the Communist Party to that of the Manchus or the Mongols in earlier periods of Chinese history. Other criticism alleged that the regime had done comparatively little to improve the conditions of the masses, especially of the peasants; and there was some criticism of the extreme pro-Soviet alignment in Chinese policy.

The Communist leaders were not prepared to tolerate this and, in June of 1957, started the 'anti-rightist' campaign which was steadily intensified. The critics were denounced, dismissed from their positions and pressed to recant their views. In some universities more than half the students were dismissed and sent out to work in the countryside. The non-Communist parties, which had enabled the regime to claim that it was a coalition, were told that in future they must completely accept Communist leadership.

The events of this period can explain the present attitude of the Chinese regime. The Chinese Communist leaders could reasonably deduce from their own experience that a Communist regime must either remain Stalinist or else accept far reaching revisionism. (To put it in non-Communist terms, if people are once allowed some freedom to think for themselves they are bound to disagree with Communist orthodoxy.) And the Chinese now seem to be taking the lead in attacks on Tito and all forms of revisionism.

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It seems likely that this swing back to Stalinism will continue for some time to come. Having promised that people could speak freely without fear of reprisals, and having taken reprisals against those who trusted in this promise, it is hard to see how the regime could obtain any response to a more liberal policy even if it wished to try one. It is reasonable to deduce that, for some years to come, these internal factors will make the Peking regime intransigent in its foreign policy and unwilling to respond to any non-Communist attempts to increase contacts or secure co-operation.

This loss of support need not seriously weaken the regime so long as its apparatus of control remains effective and so long as it avoids really bad economic difficulties. On the industrial side the regime has considerable accomplishments to its credit. A great deal has been done in railway construction and in large scale water control schemes and there has been considerable progress in industrialization with the usual Communist emphasis on heavy industry. The leaders have now announced a target of exceeding the industrial production of the United Kingdom within fifteen years. The poorest groups in the cities seem to have improved their position but studies based on the official figures suggest that the real wages of the average factory worker are about the same as in the better pre-war years (which is, of course, much better than the situation in the East European satellite states). The average monthly wage seems to be about US\$20. To make an estimate of actual living standards one would have to credit such things as medical benefits and make a debit for strict rationing of food and clothing.

The biggest uncertainty about the Chinese economy is the agricultural situation. It is officially claimed that the condition of the peasants has greatly improved and that collectivization has been successful, but there is a good deal of evidence which casts doubts on this. Some high level official speeches have admitted that the yield per acre on collectives is lower than that obtained by the remaining individual peasants and the standards of living reported in published studies are very low. Official estimates of average per capita peasant income in 1956 vary between US\$20 and US\$24 per year with wide variations between different areas. A family budget for a family rather above the average showed fairly adequate calories but great shortage of fat (7 oz. of oil per person per month), and of clothing (4 yards of cloth per person per year), with almost no expenditure beyond minimum necessities. This may be better than the pre-war standard in some areas but it seems clear that the Communist programme of class struggle and collectivization has been much less successful than the reformist programme on Taiwan

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where average per capita annual income for the same year was US\$43 (at NT\$30=US\$1) with food prices about the same and unrationed cloth at about 30cUS per yard.

It is very hard to say how much of agricultural production is taken by the government. One report gave taxation as 8½% of output in 1956 but price policy is quite as important as tax policy when farmers have to sell all their output to one government agency and buy all their supplies through others. Some studies have estimated that the average peasant retains a smaller proportion of his product for his own use than in pre-war China.

There is a good deal of indirect evidence of peasant discontent. The press has carried many articles on measures to prevent and reverse a flow of peasants into the cities in search of better living conditions. People in Hongkong in contact with relatives on the mainland report very bad conditions in Kuangtung province. And foreign correspondents have not been allowed to visit the countryside except for a few villages which are obvious show places. One can only speculate as to whether this discontent could become serious enough to endanger the regime.

Government policy on the population problem has varied. For some time all official statements took the orthodox Communist line that a population problem was theoretically impossible. Statements in 1957 admitted that China had a serious population problem and a large scale campaign to spread birth control was started. More recent official statements seem to show a return to the orthodox Communist view.

For the outside world the most important unknown is Chinese foreign policy. Some fairly confident deductions can be made. There is, for example, a lot of evidence that China is not a Soviet satellite in the same sense as the East European countries; on the other hand, the dependence of China on the Soviet Union for military supplies and the industrialisation programme makes it unlikely that China is the dominant partner in determining international Communist policy. Again, recent Sino-Japanese relations show that the Peking government is more interested in political than in economic objectives and will use its foreign trade policy to try to obtain them. However, many of the most important questions simply cannot be answered on the basis of present evidence.

The Chinese press gives frequent official statements of foreign policy but it is very hard to judge what should or should not be taken seriously. For example, the conquest of Taiwan and the offshore islands has been announced as a high priority objective

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for the past five years but no one seems to have predicted that military action was likely to start in August, 1958. To answer most of the important questions about Chinese policy one would need to cross-question the Communist leaders. Few people have had the opportunity to do this; of these few have used the opportunity, and the answers they have received have been largely evasive. The limited evidence suggests that most of the Chinese Communist leaders have very little understanding of the outside world and believe a great deal of their own propaganda. Many Chinese actions, otherwise hard to explain, are intelligible on the hypothesis that Chinese policy is formulated in terms of a Marx-Leninist model of the world which differs widely from the real world. And there is a very strong emotionally charged reluctance to admit that the general picture of the world given by the Chinese press is seriously distorted; that, for example, it is extremely misleading to suggest that the American Communist Party has widespread popular support.

Thus, while it is easy to say that we need to know more about China, it is hard to say how this knowledge could be obtained. *If* people with enough background knowledge to ask the important questions could visit China and *if* they could meet the right people and get answers from them, the problem would be easy. But both 'ifs' are very big 'ifs'. Even during the more liberal period the opportunities for observation and discussion were limited. Since the 'anti-rightist' campaign entry to mainland China has become more difficult and the movements of foreign diplomatists in China have been restricted. Under present conditions a research worker in Hongkong or, if he has the right contacts, in Taipei can probably learn more than a correspondent or diplomatist stationed in Peking. Until there has been some shift in the Communist Party line towards allowing freer contacts with the non-Communist world, additional knowledge about China will have to come mainly from fuller use of the existing sources of information. And there is a good deal that could still be done if the interest and resources were available.

31st August, 1958.

INDOCHINA AND SEATO

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IN SEVERAL RESPECTS the Indochinese area is crucial to SEATO. SEATO itself was founded in the wake of the Indochinese war and in response to an Indochinese crisis which seemed to endanger the security of all South-East Asia. In the Manila Treaty of 1954 the three non-Communist states of Indochina—Cambodia, Laos and South Vietnam, were put under express SEATO protection by virtue of a special protocol. The problems and tasks facing the Indochinese states are representative of all South-East Asia.

According to a wide-spread if little analysed opinion, the Geneva accords of 1954 prohibit the states of Indochina from entering an alliance such as SEATO. This article examines critically the correctness of this view, goes on to indicate the role played by SEATO in Indochinese diplomacy of the past four years and concludes by surveying the place which the three states might occupy in SEATO's future development.

THE GENEVA AGREEMENTS

The 1954 Geneva settlement of the Indochinese problem has been embodied in a confusing tangle of bilateral agreements, unilateral statements and joint declarations, which bear the mark of the haste in which they were negotiated and from which it is difficult to extract clear legal obligations. Yet on a strict view none of the Geneva documents can be interpreted as imposing a barrier to one of the Indochinese states at present becoming member of the SEATO alliance.

The least ambiguous obligation with respect to alliances seems to be that contained in Article 19 of the 'Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam'. In addition to prohibiting the establishment of new foreign bases in the two 'regrouping zones' (euphemism for North and South Vietnam) Article 19 provides that

'the two parties shall ensure that the zones assigned to them do not adhere to any military alliance and are not used for

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the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy.¹

Yet the parties to that agreement were only the Commanders in Chief of the 'People's Army of Vietnam' and of the 'French Union Forces in Indochina', hence according to the rules of international law the agreement can confer rights and duties only on those two parties and on third states only in so far as they agree to be bound by it. In 1954 it was assumed that French Union forces would have to be kept in Vietnam for some considerable period and that France would thus remain in a position to enforce the observance of the agreement. But the last French troops left South Vietnam less than two years after the signing of the truce and the French Union High Command in Indochina (one of the parties to the agreement) was dissolved on 28 April 1956. France is therefore no longer in the position of 'ensuring' that the 'zone assigned to her' abstains from military alliances. She has in fact formally given notice that she is not prepared to 'continue to assume any further direct or special responsibility for the implementation of the Geneva agreements in Vietnam' and claimed in a later communication that her stand had received the tacit agreement of the United Kingdom and the USSR, the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.² The French stand is however contested by North Vietnam which argues that France cannot be released from her responsibilities unless those are officially taken over by South Vietnam.

The Geneva Conference also stated in its Final Declaration (Paragraph 5) that it

'takes note of the clauses in the agreement on the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam to the effect that no military bases under the control of a foreign state may be established in the regrouping zones of the two parties, the latter having the obligation to see that the zones allotted to them shall not constitute part of any military alliance and shall not be utilised for the resumption of hostilities or in the service of an aggressive policy.'³

Yet this Final Declaration itself is an unusual international document. It is the only joint instrument produced by the conference in which nine states (France, UK, USA, USSR, China, North and South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) participated, but differs from treaties or other customary international agreements in that it carries no

1. *Further Documents relating to the discussion of Indochina at the Geneva Conference 16 June-21 July 1954*, Cmd. 9239, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office (HMSO), 1954, p. 33.

2. *Seventh Interim Report, International Commission for Supervision and Control (ICSC) in Vietnam*, Cmd. 335, London: HMSO, 1957, p. 22.

3. *Further Documents . . .* (Cmd. 9239), p. 10.

signatures. As the verbatim record of the conference indicates, the Final Declaration was intended 'to take note' of all the documents produced by the conference. The declaration was approved by representatives of France, Laos, China, the UK and the USSR, but the spokesmen of Cambodia, South and North Vietnam and the USA made separate and additional declarations of their own.¹ The record makes it clear that, in the then existing political situation, no signed and unanimously agreed declaration could in fact have been achieved. The USA 'took note' particularly of Paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration, but also associated herself with the South Vietnamese declaration (for which, see below). It is at least doubtful whether the mere fact that some of the conference participants (France, the UK) accepted the Final Declaration, which 'takes note' of Article 19 of the Armistice Agreement, obliges them to oppose South Vietnam's admission to SEATO.

Finally the question arises whether, or to what extent, the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) is itself bound by the Armistice Agreement and by Article 19 in particular. Vietnam was not a party to the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam; its delegation protested 'solemnly' against 'the hasty conclusion of the armistice agreement contracted only by the high authority of France and the Vietminh', many clauses of which gravely compromised 'the political future of the Vietnamese people', and reserved for Vietnam 'complete freedom of action to guarantee the sacred right of the Vietnamese people to territorial unity, national independence and freedom'.² The view that the South Vietnamese government did not subscribe to and is not itself bound by the Armistice Agreement has in the past been accepted by the International Control and Supervision Commission in Vietnam and implicitly also by North Vietnam (in their argument that France cannot be released from duties under the agreement until they are assumed by South Vietnam). Until 1956 the South Vietnam stand had less practical importance because France still remained responsible for the implementation of the agreements but since the French troops' departure it has become an important preoccupation of the International Commission in Vietnam. The Vietnam Republic cannot, against its will, be forced to undertake the functions of the successor to the original signatories of the agreement and it is its view that

1. *ibid.*, pp. 5-8.

2. Protest by the Vietnamese delegation, 21 July 1954, in *Documents on American Foreign Relations* 1954, ed. P. Curl, New York: Harpers 1955, pp. 315-6.

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following the winding up of the French Union Command the government is offering effective co-operation to the International Commission but is not prepared to assume France's responsibilities for the implementation of the agreement¹. As beneficiary of the agreement the Vietnam Republic may be expected also to accept some duties under it, but not necessarily the agreement in its entirety. In 1956 it refused to be bound by paragraph 7 of the Final Declaration (providing for Vietnamese elections in July 1956), on the ground that it had never agreed to it, and has in this been upheld by the UK and France.

The legal situation is less tangled with regard to Laos and Cambodia. At Geneva, China made an attempt to write into their armistice agreements provisions similar to those for Vietnam, but Cambodia in particular refused to agree to what was then described as 'complete neutralisation' (which would have prevented her from maintaining effective armed forces and from receiving foreign military assistance) and at the last moment succeeded in securing the deletion of these provisions from its armistice agreement.² Instead she made a unilateral declaration (incorporated as Article 7 into the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Cambodia) in the following terms:

"The Royal Government of Cambodia will not join in any agreement with other states, if this agreement carries for Cambodia the obligation to enter into a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, as long as its security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian territory for the military forces of foreign powers."³

The Laos Government made a similar statement, but the Laotian declaration was not incorporated into the text of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos. Both the Cambodian and the Laotian statements were mentioned in Paragraph 5 of the Final Declaration:

"The Conference takes note of the declarations of the governments of Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they will not join in any agreement with other states if this agreement includes the obligation to participate in a military alliance not in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations or, in the case of Laos, with the principles of the

1. *Seventh Interim Report . . .* (Cmd. 335), pp. 21-2.

2. *The Times* (London) 22 July 1954, *New York Times*, 22 July 1954.

3. *Further Documents . . .* pp. 13-14.

Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Laos or, so long as their security is not threatened, the obligation to establish bases on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the military forces of foreign powers.¹

The obligations incurred by Laos and Cambodia in respect of foreign alliances are less onerous than those included in the Vietnam armistice agreement. In fact they leave the decision almost entirely to the discretion of the two governments. While the Vietnam truce agreement speaks of 'military alliances' pure and simple, the Cambodian and Laotian declarations refer only to military alliances not in conformity with the United Nations Charter. In the case of Laos, the reference to the 'principles of the armistice agreement' is obscure, since military alliances are not mentioned in the Laos agreement, but may be taken to imply certain restrictions on the importation of military equipment and on the establishment of new military bases. If, in the opinion of their governments, national security is threatened the two countries would be entitled to permit foreign bases to be set up on their territories. Neither Laos nor Cambodia can therefore be said to have been 'neutralised' by the armistice agreements or prohibited from joining alliances.

We might also consider if the Manila Treaty is in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter. All the eight members of SEATO are, of course, members of the United Nations and would not agree that their SEATO membership entails obligations conflicting with those arising from the UN Charter. None of the principles enumerated in the Charter (Article 2) (such as the principle of sovereign equality of members, peaceful settlement of disputes, abstention from the threat or use of force) has been infringed by the Manila Treaty. It has also frequently been pointed out that security arrangements of this type are positively in agreement with the collective self-defence provisions (Article 51) of the Charter. Military alliances entered into for an aggressive purpose (e.g. to attack a third power) would infringe UN Charter principles but, unless it is argued that SEATO does have aggressive purposes and is designed to facilitate attack on certain third states, Cambodia and Laos are not restrained from joining that organization by obligations they assumed at Geneva.

THE BRITISH-FRENCH UNDERTAKINGS

The Geneva agreements of 1954 by themselves thus place no insurmountable legal obstacles to any of the three Indochinese states

1. *ibid.*, p. 10.

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now joining SEATO. The origins of the view that these agreements bar Indochina from joining a military alliance have rather to be sought in the diplomacy of the Geneva conference, and particularly in Premier Chou En-lai's objective of excluding American military power from Indochina and in the private understandings reached between him and the representatives of France and Britain on this subject and, subsequently, in the Chinese efforts to present their own objectives and these private understandings as the agreed results of the entire Geneva conference. Confusion was confounded by the fact (mentioned above, on p. 30) that in the last hours of the conference, after China, France and Britain had agreed to restricting the military status of Laos and Cambodia, Cambodian representatives succeeded, by pertinacious diplomacy, in gaining for their own country and for Laos almost complete freedom of action in the sphere of alliances, military supplies and foreign bases. This last minute victory, won by a determined small state after the great powers appeared to have conclusively settled the whole issue, has escaped the notice of many observers who persist in talking of the 'neutralised buffer states' of Laos and Cambodia.

Although still unborn, the regional defence arrangements contemplated for South-East Asia played an important part in the Geneva discussions. It became the aim of Chinese diplomatists to devise such armistice agreements as would exclude the United States military presence from Indochina, for in their view the planned defence arrangements were intimately linked with the establishment of new U.S. bases, the stationing of foreign troops and the dispatch of military training missions and equipment in the Indochinese area (Indian policy objectives coincided on this point with Chinese policy). The Chinese negotiators seemed willing to accept French or even British troops in the area but were 'emphatic' on excluding Americans. Several observers reported that 'the question of United States military activity in Indochina is said to be virtually paramount in the thinking of the Chinese Premier'.¹ This was the reason for the frequent mention of foreign troops and bases in the Geneva documents; the alliance clauses seemed to be added much later, seemingly as an afterthought. But, although Chou claimed to be 'fearful' of American bases (he knew the French were no longer to be feared), he was just as anxious to prevent the newly emerging states from associating themselves politically with the United States. Less widely recognised at the time, but equally important, must have been his desire to create conditions which

1. Tillman Durdin, *New York Times*, 18 July 1954; see also *The Times*, 17, 21, 23 June, 1954.

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would minimise possible incentives for India to view with favour the proposed defence organization for South-East Asia.

To secure these objectives, Chou En-lai had to offer concessions in the Geneva negotiations because continued intransigence would bring about precisely the dangers he sought to avoid: greater United States military involvement in Indochina, and possibly also suspicions on the part of India. In the middle of June he decided to make a concession by agreeing to recognise the independence of Cambodia and Laos; at the same time he insisted on assurances concerning foreign bases in these states, and these he secured from France and Britain.

Between the middle of June and the middle of July the prohibition on foreign bases acquired the label of 'neutralization' and was extended to include a prohibition on military alliances. Towards the end of the conference the Chinese sought to achieve an explicit U.S. guarantee of no military participation in Indochinese affairs, or an American guarantee of the Geneva settlement. They did not achieve this; the Americans made no promises and Chou En-lai had to settle for something less than his maximum objective. A few days before the signing of the agreements he met Eden and Mendes-France and the main topic of discussion was the proposed pact for South-East Asia. The meeting was private but, according to the *New York Times*

'Mr. Eden and M. Mendes-France reportedly assured Mr. Chou that if an armistice were reached at Geneva that neutralised Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, there would be no question of these states joining the planned South-East Asia alliance.'¹

The precise nature of the undertakings given by Eden and Mendes-France is not clear, for several reasons. They remained private promises which did not find expression in written agreements. They were not embodied in formal instruments because Cambodia effectively resisted the great powers' attempt to impose on her the status of a buffer state, and it is difficult to neutralize states against their will. And finally, different versions of the undertakings appear to be implied in the several official statements on the results of the Geneva conference.

Chou En-lai's version is naturally the widest. In his final statement on the Geneva conference he said: 'We note that after the armistice the three states of Indochina will refrain from joining any military alliance . . .'² In this observation ('we note'), unqualified

1. 18 July, 1954; see also *The Times*, 19 July, 1954.

2. NCNA 21 July 1954, in *Survey of China Mainland Press* (SCMP) (Hong-kong), No. 853, p. 6.

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and unsupported by reference to the published terms of the agreements, but evidently alluding to his talks with the French and the British, he was not backed up by the representatives of USSR or North Vietnam in their respective declarations but neither was he contradicted by the other delegates. After the Manila conference, where the three states were placed under express SEATO protection, Chinese commentaries complained that

'responsible officials of the British and French governments on a number of occasions affirmed at Geneva that the Indochinese states must not participate in any military alignment. Now these representatives have affixed their signature to this protocol in direct contravention to their promises at Geneva.'¹

In the Chinese view the British-French undertakings thus also covered even the public extension of effective American protection to the three states. But the important other point which emerges from this comment is the implied admission that apart from the British and the French no other governments may be claimed to have given undertakings on this score.

The British interpretation is narrower, but accords broadly with the Chinese view. 'It is clearly understood', maintained Anthony Eden in the House of Commons

'that none of the three states will allow the establishment of foreign military bases on its territory or will become a member of a military alliance. The purpose is to ensure that each of these countries shall be able to lead its own life in peace. This should surely be in the continuing interest of all countries represented at the Conference.'²

How 'clearly understood' the matter was remains doubtful for the third party to the understanding. Premier Mendes-France, presented on the same day in the French National Assembly a picture of the Geneva agreements that followed closely the text of the published documents. He referred to the Laotian and Cambodian declarations on alliances not in conformity with the UN Charter and claimed that even in the case of French pledges on the military status of Vietnam there was a time limit. In reply to a statement by Bidault on the 'neutralization' of the three States and in comment on a Soviet agency report that had just been circulated he declared:

'None of the three states is neutralised. I want to make this clear in response to a dispatch of a foreign news agency . . .'³

1. NCNA 12 September 1954, in SCMP 886, p. 33.

2. *U.K. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons*, Vol. 530, col. 1571, 22 July 1954.

3. *New York Times*, 24 July 1954.

But Mendes-France was having a difficult time defending the Geneva armistice in the National Assembly and, accused in the preceding weeks of being a neutralist and a destroyer of alliances, might have been reluctant to admit to yet another concession to the other side.

At Geneva France was in a weak negotiating position. Entering upon a period of withdrawal from South-East Asia, she had no reason to attach vital importance to the planned defence organization. Nor need she have been anxious to maintain for the three states the right to belong to a future alliance in which the preponderant influence would be that of the United States. The British reasons for conceding to the Chinese demands seem less obvious. Britain, too, was cutting down on her Southeast Asian commitments, but more important probably was the influence of Indian diplomacy and Eden's role as the mediator, anxious to promote agreement in his position as Co-Chairman of the Conference. In the British conception of a Western alliance in South-East Asia the three states no doubt could play only a minor role. The idea of 'neutralization' was also taken up by Australia. Mr. Casey said on 10th August 1954 that

"it seems to the Australian government that the interests of Laos and Cambodia, and indeed of world peace, would be better served by those states staying out of any security organization and becoming part of a "neutralized" area."¹

The binding force of private undertakings of the kind apparently given by the British Foreign Secretary and the French Premier is open to question. If they had in fact been given they would limit the freedom of action of the British and French governments, but they were also clearly political agreements, conditional upon the subsequent conduct of the Chinese government, and in particular upon its respect for the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of the three states on all of which subjects China, too, gave assurances. But it is also clear that the undertakings given by France and Britain do not impose any duties upon the United States, other SEATO members or the three states of Indochina. The United States' position has been somewhat ambiguous.

1. *Current Notes on International Affairs*, 25(8), August 1954, p. 582. The statement seems to have contained an incorrect interpretation of the Laos truce agreement as it maintained that it seemed 'fairly clear' that Laos could not become a member of a security organization. Cambodia, it added 'probably can', but 'it seems to have been tacitly agreed by all parties at Geneva that it would not do so'. It is not immediately obvious who is referred to in the phrase 'all parties'.

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Shortly before the signing of the agreements the United States was reported to be willing to acquiesce in the 'neutralization' of the three states, consoled by the realization that 'the pact could provide for the protection of the three states even though they were not members.'¹ Here was the germ of the SEATO Protocol and from here onwards the United States seems to have abandoned the idea of immediately including the three states as members. But by implication it also gave notice in its official declaration of 21 July (saying that it had no intention of using force or the threat thereof to disturb the Geneva settlements) that it would not hesitate to use its diplomatic resources whenever it thought the agreements to be contrary to its interests. Hence it would also be free at any time to reopen the SEATO membership question.

Less clear has been the attitude of the three Indochinese states to the alliance membership question. Cambodian and Laotian delegates had two interviews with Chou En-lai at Geneva, and at the second he made clear his opposition to foreign bases in the two countries.² But the three states do not seem to have given any private undertakings on this score apart from the obligations contained in the written agreements. At that time all three of them seem to have been at least favourably inclined towards the conception of a South-East Asian defence organization, and it must be remembered that within months all of them had experienced armed attacks from the Vietminh and that the situation was still extremely unsettled. By the time the first drafts of the Manila Treaty were being circulated it had already been decided that the Indochinese states would not be members of the new organization. Thus for example Article 4 of the third U.S. draft read in part:

'Each Party recognizes that communist aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty area against any of the Parties or against Cambodia, Laos or the territory under the jurisdiction of free Vietnamese government . . . would endanger its own peace and security . . .'³

The only question that remained to be decided was whether the new treaty would or would not make an explicit offer of protection to the three states. The United States and Thailand maintained that the three states should be directly mentioned in the main treaty, but France and Britain regarded a direct mention as inadvisable in view of the Geneva agreements and Pakistan and the Philippines

1. *New York Times*, 20 July 1954; this thought was repeated in Mr. Dulles' first comment on the signing of the Geneva agreements.

2. *ibid.*, 15 July 1954.

3. *Manila Bulletin*, 31 August 1954.

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still thought of them as unstable French-dominated areas to which it would be unwise to extend explicit protection.¹ Agreement was finally reached on a compromise solution whereby the treaty itself deals only with contingencies 'in the Treaty Area' and leaves the protection of the Indochinese states to a separate protocol which stipulates that the parties to the treaty 'unanimously designate for the purposes of Article 4 of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the Free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam'.² No action on the territory of any of these states would be taken except 'at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned'.

In the Senate hearings on the Manila Treaty Mr. Dulles thus described the circumstances which determined the form of participation of the three states in the new organization:

'The countries in question, Cambodia, Laos and free Vietnam did not themselves become parties to the treaty because of the fact that the Geneva armistice agreements at least raise a question as to the propriety of their doing so, and it seemed undesirable to some of the parties to those agreements to raise that question, particularly at a time when the armistice was in the process of being carried out and had not yet been fully carried out.

The armistice terms themselves are extremely complicated, somewhat ambiguous, with respect to these matters. It was obviously a situation where the countries concerned were properly the judges as to what was the best line for them to take. The Associated States concluded that they would be very happy to have their area included under the mantle of protection that this treaty would have about it, whether or not they themselves became signatories to the treaty.'³

Mr. Dulles' statement brings out four points: considerations of propriety, rather than of legality, were decisive; only 'some of the parties', presumably France and Britain, raised these considerations; the three states themselves were happy about being brought under

1. *New York Times*, 7, 8 September 1954.

2. France gave assurances that the three states were willing to be designated in the treaty protocol (*The Times*, 9 September 1954).

3. *The Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty*. Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 11 November 1954, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954, p. 19.

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SEATO protection;¹ the situation would be altered through the implementation of the armistice agreements.

The signatories of the Manila Treaty went to some pains not to give the impression that they were violating even the private understandings reached at Geneva. But in December 1954 the High Command of the People's Army of Vietnam protested in general terms to the International Commission alleging violation of the armistice agreement by the French in consequence of the provisions of the Manila Treaty. The Commission did not investigate the protest and requested General Giap to furnish 'full particulars in support of the charge that violations of specific articles of the agreement had occurred'.² The general does not seem to have replied and there the matter rested.

At Geneva and Manila the important decisions were made by the great powers; it was they who seemed to be deciding whether or not the three states were to join SEATO. In the years since 1954 the centre of interest has shifted to the three states themselves, and at present it is their policies which will determine whether or not they will take part in the alliance.

Since 1954 the three countries have experienced a much needed period of internal stabilization that is astonishing, especially if one remembers the gloomy forecasts of disintegration, subversion and collapse which were to be the fate of Indochina. Several influences combined to bring about this consolidation of local strength: the complete transfer of responsibilities to the local administrations, the massive American assistance programme which finances the entire armed forces of the three countries and shores up their economies, the gradual elimination of the internal Communist threat stemming from the Vietminh influence of the war years, and the presence of the International Control and Supervision Commissions with their strong Indian element. Internal stability went hand in hand with feelings of enhanced external security. The Vietminh danger, which looked ominous in the last months of the war, gradually receded, and Communist Chinese policy too seems to have moderated between 1954 and 1957.

But hard as Chou En-lai tried to present the issue of military alliances as settled at Geneva, the diplomacy of the Indochinese

1. According to W. Burchett (in 'US War against Co-existence in South-East Asia', *International Affairs* (Moscow) December 1957, p. 88) Prince Phouma, the then Laotian Premier, had told him in a personal interview 'Laos had never even asked to be placed under SEATO protection'.

2. *Second Interim Report, ICSC in Vietnam*, Cmd. 9461, London: HMSO, 1955, p. 56.

states continued to be dominated by it. As might be expected, the attitude of the three non-Communist governments towards the SEATO alliance fluctuated according to their requirements for external support and their estimate of the external dangers facing them. The more urgent the need for assistance, and for American assistance in particular, and the graver the threats confronting them, the more favourably inclined their attitude has been towards SEATO. And since their own internal stability and external security have been rising in the past four years, their need for SEATO has tended to decline. Local political conflicts began to dominate international alignments. But SEATO nevertheless remained an all-pervasive influence for two reasons: it could be used if external security deteriorated and, secondly, it served as a bargaining counter in relations with Communist and neutralist powers. By declaring their non-participation in SEATO the governments of the three states were always seen to be making a concession to communist or neutralist demands and could expect to receive a *quid pro quo* of one form or another. SEATO's mere existence strengthened their hand in their international and even local political dealings.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The most favourably disposed to SEATO is the Republic of Vietnam. This is hardly surprising if one bears in mind its uncertain international position, the recent nature of its domestic stability and its susceptibility to North Vietnam and Chinese pressure. Yet South Vietnam is also potentially a considerable asset to SEATO; it is the most populous of the three non-Communist Indochinese states and the most highly developed socially and economically, and is in the process of acquiring a well-trained army.

Between 1954 and 1956 South Vietnam contended with great internal difficulties. The new republic had to be organised from scratch, internal unity and security had to be assured, an international position built up. According to the Final Declaration of the Geneva Conference all-Vietnamese elections were to take place in July 1956 and everyone knew that if such elections were held North Vietnam would take over the entire country. And at that time SEATO was the only international grouping from which assistance could be expected in case of a sudden attack from the North. The vocal opinion in the country appreciated this; SEATO became highly regarded and popular, SEATO developments were followed with interest and signs of growing strength such as conferences and exercises welcomed with relief. In the face of intimidation from the North the Republic of Vietnam could rely not merely on its own armed strength but also on 'the assurance from the SEATO powers

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that they will stand by her side immediately should the communists attack.'¹

The SEATO membership issue came to a head in the spring of 1956. This was a critical time for Vietnam: the last French troops were leaving the country, the election date was approaching, the viability of the new state was being put to the test. At this juncture it needed all the international support it could muster and SEATO provided one way of securing it. When the SEATO Council met in Karachi in March 1956 the Vietnamese National Assembly addressed to it a special message disowning the Geneva agreements. Though SEATO membership was not mentioned, the message was interpreted as a first step in pressing a membership bid, since South Vietnam was known to be eager to join the alliance.² It was reported that the South Vietnam government has 'expressed the desire to become a member of the treaty organization. The only question remaining seems to be that of timing', claimed a Vietnamese leader-writer and went on to say that the Vietnamese application had the support of the Philippines and Thailand.³ But Vietnam was not successful. Returning from Karachi Mr. Dulles called on President Diem in Saigon; according to an Associated Press dispatch

'Mr. Dulles rejected the idea that South Vietnam should become member of the South East Asia defence alliance immediately. He advised Mr. Diem to wait for a more advantageous time and assured him of US aid in any crisis.'⁴

The reasons for the rejection of the Vietnamese application may have been varied. Britain and France probably maintained their opposition to Vietnam joining SEATO. There must have been unwillingness to antagonize the International Commission and India, and reluctance to bring in South Vietnam while leaving Cambodia and Laos outside. Cambodia in particular would feel encircled by the SEATO powers in such an event.

On 6 April 1956 President Diem announced that South Vietnam would not agree to the holding of all-Vietnamese elections; but, al-

1. *Times of Vietnam* (Saigon) 11 February 1956; this optimism may have been not altogether justified; a British author claimed earlier that if the Vietnamese government found itself in difficulties because of boycotting the elections it could expect 'no aid whatever' from Britain or France; responsibility for the fatal decision would rest upon the Americans 'who were again made aware of the attitude of their allies at the meeting of the SEATO powers in Bangkok last February'. (B. Crozier, 'The Diem Regime in Southern Vietnam', *Far Eastern Survey*, 24(4) April 1955 p. 56).

2. *New York Times* 9 March 1956.

3. *Times of Vietnam* 24 March 1956.

4. *New York Times* 15 March 1956.

though the South Vietnamese government refused to accept responsibility for implementing the armistice agreement, Diem also announced that it would 'neither take part in any military alliance nor accept any foreign military bases on its territory'. By this declaration, limiting his own freedom of action, he no doubt also made it somewhat easier for North Vietnam to acquiesce in his refusal to hold elections.

Since 1956 South Vietnam has not apparently made any attempt to gain membership in SEATO, although the issue is still from time to time the subject of press comment.¹ Vietnam's horizons have now widened and her acceptance in Asia, including the non-committed powers, has risen. She does nevertheless regard herself as a de facto partner in the alliance and follows its development with keen interest. As Vu Van Mau, the Foreign Minister put it, SEATO is 'an attempt for the defence of peace thoroughly backed by free Vietnam'.² Most recently, interest in SEATO quickened as the result of rising tension in the Formosa Straits, the tougher policies of the Peking government and North Vietnam's tendency to associate 'the U.S. imperialists' aggressive acts against China' with 'their scheme to turn South Vietnam into a colony and a military base'.³

Despite non-membership South Vietnam has in fact participated with observer status in a number of SEATO activities, such as conferences, committee meetings or exercises. Evidence on this is scarce but it is known that in July 1955 Vietnam was represented at a Bangkok meeting⁴ (probably on the subject of subversion); in September 1956 a Vietnamese General was in the Philippines at the time of the Baguio staff planners' meeting;⁵ in March 1958 Vietnamese observers attended the Manila meeting of the SEATO Council⁶ and in September 1958 the Bangkok meeting of Military Advisers.⁷ Vietnamese officers observed SEATO military exercises

1. e.g. on the occasion of President Diem's visit to the Philippines; cf. *Times of Vietnam* 1 March 1958.

2. *ibid.*, 8 March 1958. President Diem reaffirmed his country's interest in SEATO protection during his visit to India in November 1957.

3. Vietnamese News Agency 21 September 1958 quoted in *Summary of World Broadcasts* (SWB) (Reading) Pt. V. No. 805, p. 41.

4. *Times of Vietnam*, 4 February 1956.

5. *ibid.*, 8 September 1956.

6. North Vietnamese protest, quoted in *Eighth Interim Report*, ICSC in Vietnam, Cmd. 509, (London: HMSO 1958), p. 11.

7. North Vietnamese protest, Vietnamese News Agency 20 September 1958, in SWB, V, 805, p. 41.

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at Bangkok (January 1957), the Philippines (May 1957) and in Thailand (April 1958).¹ They seem well informed also of the work of such organs as the Committee of Security Experts. National delegations attending SEATO conferences frequently stop at Saigon, consult with Vietnamese officials and keep them informed of SEATO work.²

The International Control and Supervision Commission in Vietnam regards as one of its tasks 'the enforcement of obligations regarding military bases and military alliances'³ as long as no political settlement is reached for the whole country, but its work is hampered by the fact that South Vietnam does not admit responsibility under the armistice agreement. Vietnamese participation in SEATO activities falls of course short of full membership. In the civil sphere it affords Vietnam no opportunity to make its views known in the various Bangkok bodies on a continuing basis or in the status of a full member; Vietnam does not take part in any of the SEATO civil programmes; the dispatch of observers keeps her informed of the trend of events and movement of opinions also in the military sphere, but it does not enable her to partake with troops in SEATO exercises or with military planners in the continuing work of the Bangkok Military Planning Office. Correspondingly the North Vietnamese complaints to the International Commission about de facto consummation of an alliance have not been many. The reports of the Commission mention only four complaints in the past four years: about South Vietnam's inclusion in the SEATO protocol (see above p. 37); about the presence of American military aid missions, hence the de facto realisation of a military alliance with the United States;⁴ about the participation of military personnel of SEATO powers in the Republic Day celebrations in Saigon in 1956,⁵ and about the presence of observers at the SEATO Council meeting in

1. Hanoi Radio 12 September 1958 in S.W.B. V, 804, p. 37; see also *Evening News* (Manila) 8 May 1957 (according to this paper Laotian and Cambodian observers were invited to the *Airlink* exercise but refused).

2. cf. the series of conferences held in Saigon by the Filipino delegation returning from the Singapore staff planners' meeting in June 1956 (*Times of Vietnam* 30 June 1956).

3. *Fourth Interim Report, ICSC in Vietnam*, Cmd. 9654 (London: HMSO 1955), p. 15.

4. *Sixth Interim Report, ICSC in Vietnam*, Cmd. 31 (London: HMSO 1957), p. 25.

5. *Seventh Interim Report*, op. cit., p. 17; the Commission opined that 'the participation of foreign military personnel and war material in public celebrations of a ceremonial character did not necessarily prove the existence of a military alliance.'

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Manila in 1958.¹ So far the Commission have not taken any action on these matters.

LAOS

The chief issue in Laotian politics since 1954 has been the reintegration of the two provinces controlled by the Pathet Lao fighting units with the rest of the country. Periods of negotiations between the Pathet Lao and the Royal government alternated with outbursts of fighting; succeeding governments displayed differing degrees of eagerness to reach a settlement, but, in the end, with the support of the International Commission, through skilful diplomacy and in favourable international conditions, a negotiated settlement was achieved and implemented. Throughout this process the SEATO issue and the alternative policy of neutrality played a crucial part.

At first Laotian governments displayed a favourable attitude towards SEATO. At times when they were engaged in bitter fighting with the strongly entrenched Pathet Lao the Royal governments, especially when headed by Katay Sasorith, maintained contact with SEATO activities,² did not hesitate to call for the help of SEATO powers³ and expressed satisfaction with the protection afforded by the SEATO protocol.⁴ But the Laotian leaders also realised the necessity of achieving national unity through negotiated agreement and they soon became aware that such agreement could much more easily and perhaps only be reached on the basis of a policy of neutrality. What is more, on the basis of a policy of neutrality the Royal government could hope to rally the support of India behind her stand and of China, too, outflanking the Pathet Lao in military and political negotiations on the important details of the reintegration arrangements.

The Royal government needed India's backing because of India's authority in Asia and also because of Indian chairmanship of, and her casting vote on, the International Commission; this backing was secured as Laos moved closer to a neutralist position. India,

1. *Eighth Interim Report*, op. cit., p. 11.

2. As Prime Minister Sasorith visited Bangkok at the time of the first SEATO Council meeting (*New York Times* 20 February 1955); Laotian (and Cambodian) officers observed a SEATO exercise in February 1956 (cf. *Operation Firmlink*, Manila: Free Asia Press, p. 9).

3. Foreign Minister Phoui Sananikone said in an interview with a *New York Times* correspondent (published on 13 November 1955) that the government was planning an appeal to the SEATO powers.

4. Cf. Sasorith's statement of March 1956, quoted in B. Fall 'The International Relations of Laos' *Pacific Affairs* 30(1), March 1957, p. 29 or Phoui Sananikone's statement (*New York Times* 13 November 1955).

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too, was anxious to maintain Laos free from Chinese or North Vietnamese influence and outside SEATO. Laotians first espoused Nehru's Five Principles at Bandung in 1955 and from April 1956 onwards adopted them as the basis for negotiations with the Pathet Lao.

India, too, served as the mediator between Laos and China.¹ China's support was crucial because through China influence could be brought to bear upon Pathet Lao and North Vietnam towards a moderation of Pathet Lao political demands. China's support, too, Laos obtained by giving an undertaking that it would desist from joining SEATO. The first hint of an approaching settlement on the basis of neutrality came in a Chinese press article in February 1956 welcoming the Laotian acceptance of the Five Principles and indicating that this was a promising basis for a political peace in Laos.² In August 1956 Prime Minister Phouma went to Peking and announced in a joint statement with Chou En-lai that

'the government of the Kingdom of Laos declares that it is firmly resolved to carry out a policy of peace and neutrality, that it will not form any military alliance as long as its security is not menaced.'³

Phouma did not give away much in his carefully qualified statement, but for the short run at least he committed Laos to a policy of neutrality. At a press conference the same day he declared that Laos would not accept SEATO's protection:

'We cannot subscribe to SEATO (he said) because its provisions were decided without our participation. Moreover it is not in accordance with the Geneva agreements that we should join this organization.'⁴

While 'deeply moved' by the Chinese government's offer of economic aid, Phouma refused to accept assistance which would entail the presence of a Chinese economic mission in Laos.

With the blessings of India and China (and doubts on the part of the U.S.A.) neutrality became the foundation of the Laotian

1. According to Chou En-lai 'India has been indispensable in mediating Sino-Laotian friendship'. NCNA 25 August 1956 in SCMP 1360, p. 27. India played the same role in relation to Cambodia.

2. *Kuang Ming Jih Pao*, 24 February 1956, in SCMP 1240, p. 28; in April the Pathet Lao leader proposed the resumption of talks on the basis of the Five Principles.

3. NCNA 25 August 1956, in SCMP 1360, p. 31.

4. *ibid.*

reintegration settlement. The foreign policy part of the 'Joint Declaration of the Royal Government and the Pathet Lao Forces Delegation' which was signed on 5 August 1956 and formed the basis of subsequent and more detailed agreements reads:

'The two parties are agreed to adopt the foreign policy . . . according to which the Royal Government is resolved:
to follow the path of Peace and Neutrality, to sincerely apply Pandit Nehru's principles of peaceful coexistence,
to keep good relations with all countries, in particular with neighbouring countries,
to desist from adhering to any military alliance,
to allow no country to establish military bases in Lao territory apart from those foreseen in the Geneva agreement.'

The same principles were spelled out in greater detail in the 'Agreement of the Joint Political Committee on the Question of Peace and Neutrality' signed on 2 November 1956² and reiterated again in the joint statements of 28 December 1956 and 8 April 1957. On other issues, such as the cessation of hostile acts, guarantees of civil rights, integration of Pathet Lao cadres and the formation of a National Union government, negotiations were much more protracted, but, following concessions from both sides, a comprehensive settlement was finally reached and a coalition government, including two Pathet Lao ministers, set up in November 1957. With the holding of the supplementary elections in May 1958 the period of political settlement envisaged in the Geneva agreement came to an end and the International Commission in Laos adjourned its activities *sine die* and left the country in July 1958 despite Chinese and North Vietnamese opposition. The North Vietnamese government officially protested that the Commission's withdrawal was contrary 'to the spirit and letter of the Geneva agreements' and that it provided 'greater opportunities for the US imperialists to intensify their interventionist and war-seeking policy in Indochina'.³

The country entered a new stage in its political life, unified and committed to a policy of neutrality. A Cabinet of new and younger men (without Pathet Lao's participation) assumed office in August 1958 pledged to the strict observance of a neutral policy in accordance with the Five Principles and the UN Charter, but the new Prime Minister Phoui Sananikone also declared in his policy speech before the National Assembly:

1. quoted in *Third Interim Report, ICSC in Laos, Cmd. 314* (London: HMSO 1957), p. 55.

2. text quoted *ibid.*, pp. 60-1.

3. Vietnamese News Agency, 9 August 1958, in SWB, V, 793, p. 38.

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'Regarding peaceful co-existence we shall have to inform neighbouring countries that we shall coexist only with the free world. We trust only the countries that really and sincerely support us.'¹

The country remains neutral with regard to military alignments but not in ideological matters.² Signs of new political alignments in Indochina came when, in September 1958, President Diem's brother, Councillor Ngo Dinh Nhu, arrived in Vientiane for talks with the new Laos government. Laos will not join SEATO, unless its own security is threatened, but, like South Vietnam, it may develop a greater interest in some SEATO programmes.

CAMBODIA

Cambodia's attitude to SEATO has been a function of her estimate of dangers stemming from the Vietminh and also from China (she has a large Chinese minority). As long as the Vietminh (until 1955 the embodiment of the traditional Vietnamese threat to the Khmers) appeared as a direct menace, Cambodia was ready to receive Western guarantees and to maintain indirect links with SEATO. As soon as these dangers receded (Cambodia has no border with the North Vietnam of to-day) Cambodian attention shifted to problems nearer home. The Vietnamese threat now appeared to be localised in South Vietnam, especially so since for centuries past the Vietnamese have been encroaching on Cambodian possessions in Cochinchina and a large Cambodian minority is now to be found in South Vietnam. Thailand, another traditionally hostile state, aspiring to leadership over the Buddhist countries of Laos and Cambodia, also began to look menacing. As both South Vietnam and Thailand are closely identified with SEATO and the United States, Cambodia started to look for friends further away and found that both India and China were ready to encourage her in her independent policy. Although the USA has tried to maintain an uneasy neutrality in Cambodia's troubles with her immediate neighbours and has persisted in building up her independence by lavish aid, she did inevitably come under Cambodian suspicions.

These basic outlines of Cambodia's foreign policy since 1954 have been blurred and somewhat confused by the unpredictable personality of Prince Norodom Sihanouk, one time King, several times Prime

1. Vientiane Radio, 15 August 1958, in SWB, V, 795, p. 62.

2. 'Nous sommes neutres, uniquement sur le plan militaire mais au point de vue idéologique, nous tenons a la monarchie constitutionnelle, a la democratie . . .' Prince Phouma in *Lao Presse* (Vientiane) 12 June 1958.

Minister and the dominant political figure of Cambodia. The Prince dislikes stable political arrangements of the type adopted by his neighbours which, he fears, would cut down the political stature of Cambodia, and seeks to restore to his kingdom 'a little of the prestige and glamour it enjoyed in the times of Angkor'.¹ His highly personal diplomacy, his liking for 'la "grande diplomatie" et la politique des alliances'² in the older sense of rapidly shifting international alignments (described by his critics as the policy of 'grandeur and flirting all round'), and his use of international disputes to strengthen his position at home, seem to ignore the basic weakness of his country, introduce an element of instability into the regional political system and serve as a wedge for the injection of Chinese and Soviet influence. But he would turn with equal alacrity to the assistance of the United States or SEATO if he felt his security was menaced either by Communist China or by North Vietnam.

At first, Cambodia sought to safeguard her independence by reliance on United States power. Shortly after the ceasefire, fearing that the unsettled conditions in South Vietnam provided only a few months respite before a Communist take-over, Cambodia requested from the United States a bilateral guarantee of territorial integrity and independence.³ But the Cambodian request became part of the negotiations leading up to the Manila conference and in the event the guarantee was given in the form of the SEATO Protocol. There is no evidence that the then government disliked the promise of protection contained in the protocol. American support for Cambodian independence was reinforced by a programme of aid for the armed forces, embodied in the Military Aid Agreement of 16 May 1955, and ever since Cambodian forces have been maintained entirely by American aid (supervised by a mission of 30 officers). Despite Chinese and North Vietnamese protests that the agreement 'takes the character of a military alliance with the United States, the leaders of the SEATO aggressive bloc', the International Commission held to the opinion that in practice the receiving of aid under the agree-

1. Royal Message of 24 January 1955, in *Second Progress Report*, ICSC in Cambodia, Cmd. 9534, London: HMSO 1955, p. 32.

2. Prince Sihanouk in 'La monarchie Cambodgienne' Pt. III *Realites Cambodgiennes* (Phnom Penh) 7 June 1958; the article is a good clue to the Prince's thinking about alliances; he points out that in the past Cambodia could have escaped the Thai-Vietnamese encirclement by allying herself with such more distant powers as Laos, Burma or China.

3. Z. M. Szaz 'Cambodia's Foreign Policy', *Far Eastern Survey*, 24(10) October 1955, pp. 153-4.

4. Letter from Gen. Giap in *Fourth Progress Report*, ICSC in Cambodia, Cmd. 9579, London: HMSO 1955, p. 18.

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ment will be in conformity with the Geneva agreements, but also took note of the Cambodian government's assurances of neutrality.¹

Following the first meeting of the SEATO Council in Bangkok Secretary Dulles visited Phnom Penh and assured the then King Sihanouk of the SEATO protection for Cambodia.² Reportedly the King expressed satisfaction at the outcome of the Council meeting (at which French doubts about American military aid for Cambodia were allayed). But Cambodian policy had already begun to swing in the direction of greater neutrality. On his return from Peking in November 1954 Pandit Nehru visited Cambodia. 'Circles close to the Indian Prime Minister did not fail to expound the theory that the Indian sphere of influence, which Red China would have to respect, coincided with the borders of Indian cultural influence'³ and included both Laos and Cambodia. From December 1954 onwards Cambodian spokesmen began to emphasize the theme of neutrality and found it a popular line to follow. Sihanouk returned Nehru's visit in February 1955 and at Bandung came out in favour of the Five Principles and identified himself with the Colombo powers, without surrendering his own diplomatic initiative.

At the end of 1955 stability returned to Cambodia. The Khmer resistance forces had been reintegrated into national life, elections had been held and their results decisively vindicated the Prince's policies. At Bandung, too, Cambodia had received assurances of the Vietminh's peaceful intentions in Cambodia. In this atmosphere relations with immediate neighbours assumed greater importance and began to deteriorate rapidly, and SEATO was inevitably brought into the ensuing disputes.

One of these disputes started in obscure circumstances in February 1956; it involved some islands in the Gulf of Siam, Cambodian claims in Cochinchina and to a temple on Thai territory, Vietnamese 'insults' to Sihanouk, and culminated in a blockade of the country both by South Vietnam and by Thailand. In the course of the

1. The Cambodian International Commission regards as part of its task the 'reporting on' (but not 'enforcement of' as in Vietnam) 'the observance or non-observance by the Cambodian government of its declaration concerning the establishment of foreign military bases and the conclusion of military alliances'. In *First Progress Report*, ICSC in Cambodia, Cmd. 9458, London: HMSO 1955, p. 4.

2. *New York Times* 1 March 1955.

3. Szaz, *op. cit.*, p. 156.

heated and short-tempered exchanges which accompanied these developments Cambodian spokesmen alleged that pressure was being exerted on Cambodia for its refusal to join SEATO. Secretary Dulles in his turn described as 'utterly false' allegations that the United States had been trying to coerce Cambodia into the SEATO alliance under the penalty of withholding economic aid or that it had obliged South Vietnam and Thailand to impose measures of economic warfare for the same end.¹ In a lengthy retort the Prince agreed that the United States had never officially and publicly commented upon Cambodia's stand but maintained that there had been no lack of private American advice on the part of the press in particular, and that during his visit to the Philippines in February 1956 private attempts (which he traced back to the U.S. Embassy) had been made to make him deliver speeches condemning Communist subversion.² The Prince adduced no concrete facts to prove that in the Philippines he had been pressured into joining SEATO; during his visit there he made a strongly 'neutralist' speech before the Congress and won considerable applause for it; Filipino officials denied that entry into SEATO had been discussed with the Prince and said they sympathised with, instead of resenting, Cambodia's neutral policy.³

What had more likely annoyed both South Vietnam and Thailand and caused a deterioration in relations was the Prince's subsequent visit to Peking in the course of which he accepted Chinese economic aid and also declared at a press conference

'Cambodia is neutral. The people themselves request me to maintain neutrality whatever may happen. The SEATO has told us that we would be automatically protected. We reject such protection which can only bring us dishonour.'⁴

At a time when South Vietnam was seeking admittance to SEATO this statement was, not surprisingly, 'not at all warmly received in Saigon'.⁵ The crisis settled down after the Prince tendered one of his resignations; Cambodia decided to exchange diplomatic representatives with South Vietnam and the American Ambassador renewed assurances that aid was offered without strings.

1. *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. 34, 1956, p. 725.

2. Bulletin issued by the Cambodian Mission in Bangkok, 25 April 1956.

3. *Manila Bulletin*, 4, 7 February 1956.

4. NCNA 18 February 1956, in SCMP 1233, p. 33. In Moscow, a few months later, he was reported as having said, more cautiously: 'We have freely accepted to be neutral . . . as long as we will not be threatened'.

5. *Times of Vietnam* 14 April 1956.

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Cambodia continued in its policy of 'Peace and Neutrality', and a law on Neutrality was passed by the National Assembly in 1957. Tensions on the South Vietnamese border flared up briefly in 1957, and led to some incidents in June 1958. Disappointed again over Western failure to support Cambodia, Prince Sihanouk declared that his country needed firm allies and soon afterwards announced his country's recognition of China. During the Prince's second visit to Peking (August 1958) Premier Chou En-lai confirmed China's support for the Cambodian stand in the disputes with her neighbours, expressing regret at the 'extremely unfriendly acts' of 'invasion and blockade' but Sihanouk on his part also evidenced concern over the consequences his act of recognition might have on the Chinese in Cambodia and sought assurances that they will be discouraged from taking part in political activity. Cambodia's recognition of China caused new alarm in Saigon, Bangkok and Vientiane, but there is no reason to suppose that it altered her basically opportunistic policy of short-run alignments.

SEATO AND INDOCHINA

SEATO means different things to different people. To some, it is primarily a Western military alliance, an arrangement between the United States, Britain and France, designed to contain Communist China. In this enterprise the alliance requires cooperation of South-East Asian states; but their role is seen only as a minor one. They might serve as auxiliaries to Western power and as providers of military bases,¹ but (Indochina in particular) are hardly capable of surviving or defending themselves effectively without the assistance of foreign troops. This was the aspect of SEATO that was so prominent in Western eyes in the critical months of 1954 when the future of South-East Asia seemed to be at stake. This, too, seems to have been the picture which the Chinese leaders had foremost in their minds when they insisted on the exclusion of foreign, and particularly American, bases and what seemed directly implied by them, military alliances, from the Indochinese area. And this, too, is the aspect of SEATO which offers the least attraction to potential new South-East Asian SEATO members.

In terms of the 'Western alliance' concept of SEATO, Indochinese 'neutralization' made sense. This simply meant that the Western powers would forego the right of asking the three states to join their group, refrain from setting up bases and expect the other powers to do likewise. And they could do so as long as the Indo-

1. In the same way that Iceland or Portugal were brought into NATO, as suppliers of air and naval bases.

chinese states themselves were thought to be passive objects on the world stage, with insignificant objectives of their own and no power to implement them. As long as the three states have only negligible forces of their own, as long as their contribution to joint defence remains minimal the loss involved in their neutralization is small.

The 'Western alliance' conception of SEATO is no longer as convincing as it was in 1954. France has withdrawn virtually all of its powerful forces from Indochina and is no longer a military and little of a political influence in South-East Asia. Britain's forces are contracting and in the maintenance of existing British commitments Australian and New Zealand resources play an increasing role. And the divergencies on policy towards China are if anything more pronounced than ever. In essence SEATO rests to-day on American power and is no longer an effective partnership of the three great allies.

If 'Western alliance' is unsatisfactory, so is 'neutralization' as applied to Indochina. States are not neutralized just because they harbour no foreign troops or bases or belong to no military alliance; such is in fact the 'natural condition' of many independent states which answer or have answered to that description without being thought neutralized. The limitations of Geneva are not stringent or precise enough to put obstacles in the way of determined governments. Nor can neutralization be imposed irrespective of the aims and power constellations in the affected states. Neutralized states abstain from active foreign policies and have powers of independent survival. Of the four 'neutralized' states of Indochina, North and South Vietnam are both revisionist states and are least subject to neutralization; both South and North Vietnam need allies to survive and to recover lost territories (but being both of equal strength they may effectively balance each other off). Cambodia, too, maintains an active foreign policy, has claims on Vietnamese and Thai territory, yet needs foreign assistance to maintain internal strength. Laos, finally, is too weak to survive unaided; she needs allies and strength that springs from cooperative action. And it is just as obvious that neutralization does not arrest internal political processes, the organization of minorities, the growth of Communist parties, the consolidation of governmental machines, each of which factors will affect future international alignments and the interests of surrounding states.

A more penetrating and up-to-date conception of SEATO is that which recognises it to be essentially an 'American guarantee' for South-East Asia, which is an area of independent yet small and

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underdeveloped states that need the support of an outside great power if they are to maintain a separate existence. Through the Manila Treaty the United States has formally extended this guarantee to a number of countries of South-East Asia. In practice this purpose is being accomplished through keeping, in the Western Pacific, a powerful naval force armed with the nuclear deterrent. This force draws upon itself the brunt of Chinese power and until it is removed, outmanoeuvred or defeated China will not be able to make her will prevail in South-East Asia. This purpose is also being accomplished through generous foreign aid, large military assistance and prompt political support for South-East Asian states.

The 'American guarantee' aspect of SEATO is more acceptable to the Indochinese states than the passive role of front-line Western auxiliaries. And yet, why SEATO? To get the benefit of the American guarantee, states do not have to be in an organization. The Indochinese states receive it through the SEATO protocol; other exposed states such as Burma are in no doubt that, if they needed it, they could also rely upon it. The potential availability of American power strengthens the political position of all states in the Treaty Area who are non-members: Chinese policy makers realise that by even slightly increasing pressure on any of these countries they run the risk of pressing it more firmly into the American alignment. Traditionally this has always been the advantage enjoyed by the uncommitted third power which lasts as long as neither side plays from strength and forces a showdown when neutrals are forced to choose sides and lose their artificially inflated importance. But in a situation of nuclear stalemate the small uncommitted power might carry on longer than one is apt to suppose. A key feature of the stalemate is the 'sterilization' of the power of the great and the added room for manoeuvre it offers to the small. Hence the Indochinese states would have little to gain and more to lose by joining a firm alliance.

Finally, there is a third conception of SEATO, that of a 'regional political association' for, in addition to an American guarantee, the SEATO Treaty also contains a regional collective security element. Member states in the treaty area (Thailand, Pakistan, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand) have undertaken to extend to each other the benefits of article four (mutual help in case of aggression and subversion) on the basis of full reciprocity (the American guarantee is unilateral, not reciprocal). Thus for the first time Australia, for instance, has offered to help defend the Philippines, or Pakistan, and the Philippines, Thailand. The concept of the Treaty Area, which dominates the treaty and is basic to all SEATO

operations, indicates, too, that the primary benefits of the association are to be localised within a certain region. SEATO's existence has extended the range of contacts between Treaty area members, and thus no doubt added to e.g. Australian links with the Philippines, Thailand or Pakistan. Most of SEATO activity is understood in terms of operations benefiting the area states and these in turn form the basis of a political association.

Of the three SEATO conceptions, this seems to be least heeded, least understood and most difficult of realization. Young and assertive nationalism prevails throughout the area. Traditions of South-East Asian political cooperation are lacking. Positions adopted within SEATO too are frequently based on parochial preoccupations and on a narrow interpretation of national interests. With its limited treaty area membership SEATO itself provides only a narrow basis for joint political action. And in the prevailing climate of opinion political initiatives issuing from SEATO and addressed to non-members would likely be listened to only with considerable suspicion.

A political basis of common interests nevertheless exists for co-operation among the states of South-East Asia. They are all small, new, underdeveloped and relatively isolated states which are exposed to overwhelming pressures from the surrounding giants. They are all eager to persevere along an independent course but each individually lacks means of doing so. They all rely on links with outside powers, but in addition they could deal more effectively with certain common problems in unison. SEATO, a 'regional political association': SEATO, backed by an American guarantee and yet essentially regional, is a potential source of political initiative for the whole area.

Conceptually one can envisage this as a possibility, but its prospects appear poor, particularly so unless SEATO itself becomes more regional in nature. And it is here that the Indochinese states would have a role to play by strengthening the South-East Asian element in SEATO. They might join if Chinese policy becomes tougher and more demanding and if in consequence the neutralist argument sounds less convincing, and they will join if SEATO itself develops as a means of expressing South-East Asian aspirations. And, if this ensued, the possible domestic loss (in Cambodia, conceivably in Laos) consequent upon joining in a political organization associated with the United States would be offset by gaining additional access to the decision-making processes of several important states and new opportunities for advancing their own views. In SEATO, too, the

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smaller Indochinese states of Laos and Cambodia would find a context in which their close links with both Thailand and Vietnam could be discussed with minimum opportunities for either Thai or Vietnamese assertions of their superior power (which would be offset by the presence of the other members). In the development of South-East Asian regional cooperation lies Indochina's opportunity in SEATO.

THE SCIENTIFIC PRETENSIONS OF PROFESSOR MORGENTHAU'S THEORY OF POWER POLITICS

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INTRODUCTION

SINCE THE END OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR a theory of international relations, usually misnamed 'realism', has become very popular. It is now the predominant theory taught in the universities and held implicitly or explicitly by policy-makers and the 'informed' public. While many factors, such as the inter-war failure of the League of Nations, have contributed to the popularity of this theory, its general acceptance is not justified on its own merits.

The so-called 'realists' assert that foreign policy consists of the pursuit of power or national interest and that the introduction of ethical or legal considerations into it is 'utopian'. They construct a power or balance of power theory which they claim is 'realistic' (i.e. of scientific character), and, on the basis of this, advocate power or interest policies and condemn attempts to regulate or reform international affairs.

This article is primarily concerned with the scientific or 'realistic' claims of so-called 'realism'. It maintains that not only is the equation of power with 'reality' and morals with 'utopia' unsound, but that the very presentation of a theory of international relations in terms of this dichotomy is unscientific or uninformative; and that the measures advocated by the so-called 'realists' are conducive to war.

A difficulty in criticising the so-called 'realists' arises from the ambiguous, inconsistent, and *ad hoc* character of their writings. While this enables them to evade criticism and to claim continually that they have been misunderstood or misrepresented, it is in fact

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a sign of the weakness and not of the strength of their theories. Rather than criticize a body of thought which is impossible to pin down, I shall concentrate my remarks on Professor Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*,¹ as a thorough-going statement of the so-called 'realist' position. Although differences exist among the so-called 'realists', these are—from the point of view of the scientific study of international relations—largely differences within a common set of assumptions. As I question this common set of assumptions, my criticism of *Politics Among Nations* could also be applied in varying degrees to the writings of the other so-called 'realists' in the way indicated towards the end of this paper.

LOGICAL INCONSISTENCY AND EMPIRICAL INADEQUACY

Professor Morgenthau's theory is that the aspiration for power, which is inherent in human nature, is the 'reality' of all politics. Whereas a government with power to enforce order exists in domestic politics no such sovereign authority exists in international politics. The international society consists of independent sovereign states responsible only to themselves. International politics are, therefore, of necessity, power politics. Would-be reformers of international politics are 'utopian', for the aspiration and struggle for power is not a phenomenon which can be removed, but an 'elemental bio-psychological drive' 'universal in time and space'. In the struggle for power among states, each state pursues its own national interest. International policies reveal two 'basic patterns'—that of the 'status quo' states whose interest is the preservation of the existing power distribution and that of the 'imperialist' states whose interest is its revision or overthrow. This leads of necessity to the balance of power—a self-regulating 'mechanism' or 'equilibrium' analogous to a pair of scales in that power tends to be distributed with approximate equality between the 'status quo' and the 'imperialist' states. The balance of power is the main limiting factor to the power aspirations of states. Small states owe their existence to it, and it preserves us from continuous war. Nevertheless, wars do occur because of the uncertainty of the balance of power—due to the uncertainty of calculations in international affairs—which renders it imperfect as a stabilising force. Attempts to avert war by such means as collective security, disarmament, international institutions like the League of Nations and the United Nations, international law or morality etc. ignore the 'realities' of power and are, therefore 'doomed to failure'. The only 'realistic' course in the world as it

1. All quotations unless otherwise stated will be from H. S. Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations*, Second Edition 1954. The italics are mine.

is today—and it is doubtful if this can prevent war—is not to disregard the social forces of international politics but to accommodate ourselves to them and to pursue a balance of power diplomacy—i.e. a 'realistic' authoritarian diplomacy which pursues the national interest and not a 'crusading' diplomacy which pursues abstract ideals.

Despite Professor Morgenthau's claims his theory is neither logical nor empirical.¹ Professor Morgenthau claims that his theory is based upon what actually happens yet he complains that what actually happens does not conform to his theory. While he maintains that all international politics are of necessity power politics his reason for writing is to combat the prevalence of misguided 'legalism' and 'moralism' not only in the theory, but also in the practice of international politics. For instance, on page 5 he writes 'we assume that statesmen act in terms of interest defined as power and the evidence of history bears that assumption out', yet on page 11 he describes the Franco-British policy to Russia in 1939 and the present American policy to Communist China as two 'from the many historical examples' of 'legalism' and 'moralism' in foreign policy. Professor Morgenthau, therefore, states, to use his own words, that 'the evidence of history' bears out an assumption for which there are 'many historical examples' to the contrary. If Professor Morgenthau's theory of power politics is empirical there cannot be so much 'legalism', 'moralism', 'Wilsonianism', 'idealism', 'utopianism', 'crusading' etc. in international politics. If there is so much of this then his theory cannot be empirical.

Professor Morgenthau describes international politics as being inherently and unalterably power politics yet he prescribes a 'realistic' diplomacy to alter and improve them. On page 4 he writes: 'this being inherently a world of opposing interests and conflict among them, moral principles can never be fully realized', yet on page 534 he writes: 'for the world state to be more than a dim vision, the accommodating processes of diplomacy, mitigating and minimising conflicts, must be revived'. On the one hand, conflict is inherent, on the other it can be mitigated by diplomacy. Moreover, although

1. Opening paragraph:—'This book purports to present a theory of international politics. The test by which such a theory must be judged is not *a priori* and abstract but empirical and pragmatic . . . It must meet a dual test, an empirical and a logical one: do the facts as they actually are lend themselves to the interpretation the theory has put upon them, and do the conclusions at which the theory arrives follow with logical necessity from its premises? In short is the theory consistent with the facts and within itself?'

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diplomacy can mitigate conflict and even possibly lead to a world state, collective security, disarmament and effective international institutions somehow do not come within its scope but are 'doomed to failure' by the inherent 'realities' of power.

There is an inconsistency between determinism and indeterminism throughout the whole of Professor Morgenthau's theory. In chapter eleven Professor Morgenthau describes the balance of power as 'inevitable', 'mechanistic' and 'necessary' and as 'the social equilibrium' and 'elemental pattern' of international politics. Yet in chapter fourteen he describes it as 'uncertain', 'inadequate', and 'unstable'. For instance, on page 155 he writes 'the aspiration for power on the part of several nations each trying either to maintain or to overthrow the status quo, leads of *necessity* to a configuration that is called the balance of power. We are using the term "*of necessity*" advisedly for here again we are confronted with the basic misconception . . . that men have a choice between power politics and its *necessary outgrowth*, the *balance of power*, on the one hand, and a different and better kind of international relations on the other.' However, on page 186 he writes: 'rational calculation which is the very life blood of the balance of power becomes a series of guesses the correctness of which can be ascertained only in retrospect.' If the balance of power is 'inevitable' and 'necessary' it cannot depend on 'rational calculation' and 'guesses' and, if these are 'the very life-blood' of the balance of power, then it cannot be 'necessary' and 'inevitable'. Moreover, what is the point of calculating if the balance of power is 'necessary' and 'inevitable' anyway? Similarly, Professor Morgenthau's determinist conception of the status quo—imperialist antagonism as the 'elemental pattern' of international politics—is incompatible with his indeterminist definitions of status quo (seeking to retain one's power) and of imperialism (seeking to increase one's power). The description of the status quo—imperialist antagonism as the inexorable or 'elemental pattern' of international politics presupposes the operation of a single deterministic law or motivation of power over which states have no control. However, the definitions of status quo, as seeking to retain one's power, and of imperialism, as seeking to increase one's power, imply the operation of two different laws or motivations of power. If two laws or motivations of power are operative in international politics (i.e. if states can pursue either status quo or imperialist policies) there must be a freedom of choice, at least between these two alternatives. If such a freedom of choice exists the status quo—imperialist antagonism cannot be described as the 'elemental pattern' of international politics. There is no necessity for half the .

states to choose imperialist and the other half to choose status quo policies. All could choose imperialist or status quo policies, and in the latter case antagonism would cease to exist.

On page 5, Professor Morgenthau describes foreign policy as being a 'continuum by and large consistent within itself, regardless of the different motives, preferences and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen', yet on page 510 he writes that the diplomat 'must appraise the importance for the development of foreign policy of different personalities in the government and the political parties' and that 'upon the reliability of his reports and the soundness of his judgment the success or failure of the foreign policy of his government and its ability to preserve peace may well depend'. If foreign policy is an impersonal 'continuum' independent of 'intellectual and moral qualities' how can the preservation of peace and the success or failure of a foreign policy depend on one person's judgment of other people, and if individuals have no impact on foreign policy why should the diplomat even bother to appraise them? If on the other hand different personalities can make the difference between war and peace, then foreign policy cannot be an impersonal 'continuum'.

Professor Morgenthau uses the terms power and interest in different and inconsistent ways. In the mechanistic part of his theory, power and interest describe universal deterministic laws to which the policies of states must conform and which govern international politics irrespective of the desires of statesmen. (According to this usage national interest and power must always coincide.) For it is only on the assumption that statesmen are not free to determine their policies, that it is possible to write of foreign policy as an impersonal 'continuum', of international law, morals, institutions, ideologies and attempts at reform as 'doomed to failure', and of the balance of power and the status quo—imperialist antagonism as 'elemental patterns'. In the non-mechanistic part of his theory Professor Morgenthau uses the terms power and interest to refer to policies decided upon by statesmen, in which case national policies are determined by decision-makers and not by deterministic 'elemental' laws. (According to this usage power need not coincide with national interest if a statesman so decides.) For it is only on the assumption that statesmen are free to decide their interests and determine their policies that it is possible to write of 'idealistic' and 'realistic' diplomacy.

Professor Morgenthau therefore gives two accounts of international politics—one based on determinist laws and the other on free or indeterminist decisions. The logical outcome of a determinist

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theory of power is not a balance of power but continuous war. The logical outcome of an indeterminist theory depends on the decisions of statesmen and cannot be known independently of these. Professor Morgenthau's determinist theory of power does not lead to continuous war only because indeterminist elements are incorporated into it in order to make the formation of a balance of power possible (through states deciding whether their interests are status quo or imperialist and making the corresponding alliances). Once formed the balance of power is again depicted as determinist in order to be the stabilizing force of peace (preventing states from deciding to go to war) until it again becomes indeterminist in order to account for the occurrence of war (through the uncertainty of the balance of power due to the miscalculation of statesmen). Thus, in Professor Morgenthau's theory, the occurrence of war tends to be explained both as the result of 'objective' laws of power and of subjective decisions about national interests.

The logical confusion of Professor Morgenthau's theory arises because, while he explains international politics in terms of 'elemental' or 'objective' laws,¹ he has, at the same time, to describe statesmen as failing to conform to these 'elemental' laws in order that his advocacy might influence international politics—for if international politics were as determinist as the main body of his theory implies there would be no point in Professor Morgenthau writing his book. He condemns 'utopianism' as 'doomed to failure' due to the 'inevitability' of power politics, yet this very condemnation assumes that power politics are not inevitable in order to explain the existence of 'utopianism'; similarly while the very possibility of a 'realistic' or 'idealistic' diplomacy presupposes free will and decisions, what a 'realistic' diplomacy is supposed to achieve is a stable balance of power which is 'necessary' or 'inevitable' anyway. In condemning 'utopianism' and advocating 'realism' Professor Morgenthau presupposes indeterminism to explain the departure from and return to the determinism of his theory.

The difficulty in empirically refuting Professor Morgenthau's theory arises not so much from lack of contrary evidence as from establishing exactly what the theory says. In order to come to

1. Page 4. 'Political realism believes that politics like society in general is governed by *objective laws* that have their roots in human nature. In order to improve society it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to men's preference men will only challenge them at risk of failure.'

grips with the theory, and to avoid wordy arguments about the meanings of terms such as power, I shall distinguish between a wide or ambiguous and a narrow or specific interpretation of the theory. I shall argue that the theory has to be interpreted ambiguously in order to accommodate otherwise irreconcilable evidence, and specifically in order to justify Professor Morgenthau's (and the so-called realists') message. In its ambiguous form there is no evidence that the theory could not conceivably be made to cover and therefore it is empirically empty. In its specific form the theory can be easily refuted and, therefore, its message is unsound.

Professor Morgenthau uses the term power much more ambiguously for purposes of accommodating evidence than for purposes of propounding his theory and justifying his message. In the narrow or specific interpretation of his theory the ends of policy and the human element play little part. Power is inherent in the nature of society and international politics are 'of necessity' power politics.¹ Law, morality, ideology and international institutions are merely disguises for the 'elemental' struggle for power and statesmen have no alternative but to accommodate themselves to this. In the wide or ambiguous interpretation of his theory not only is power used for the aims or ideologies of foreign policy but also for a wide

1. Pages 29-30. 'The aspiration for power being the distinguishing element of international politics as of all politics, international politics is *of necessity power politics* . . . Since the end of the Napoleonic Wars, even larger groups in the Western World have been persuaded that the struggle for power on the international scene is a temporary phenomenon, a historical accident that is bound to disappear once the peculiar historic conditions which gave rise to it have been eliminated . . . While we shall have more to say later about these theories it is sufficient to state that the struggle for power is *universal in time and space* and an undeniable fact of experience. It cannot be denied that throughout historic time, regardless of social, economic and political conditions, states have met each other in contests of power. The position taken here might be criticised on the grounds that conclusions drawn from the past are unconvincing and that to draw such conclusions has always been the main stock in trade of enemies of progress and reform. Though it is true that certain social arrangements have always existed in the past it does not follow that they must always exist in the future. The situation is, however, different when we deal not with *social arrangements and institutions created by man* but with those *elemental biopsychological drives by which society in turn is created*.'

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variety of apparently important and indeterministic human factors.¹ Here power is described as being complex, relative and changeable and, therefore, difficult to evaluate. Policies are described as seeking to keep, increase or demonstrate power; aiming at local, continental or universal domination by military, economic or *cultural* or *ideological* means or any combination of these. Clearly there is little or nothing that could not be interpreted as conforming to this power political theory in its ambiguous form² and a great deal which contradicts it in its specific form; and this can be demonstrated even with the aid of Professor Morgenthau's own examples.

Professor Morgenthau chooses the British withdrawal from India in 1947 as an example of his power political theory. On page 131 he writes: 'Today the institutional excellence of the British foreign service reveals itself in the skill with which Great Britain retreated from India and brought its commitments all over the world into harmony with the reduced resources of its national power.' In 1947 the British voluntarily withdrew from India. This withdrawal had been promised in the 1945 Labour Party election manifesto on moral grounds. It took place when it did because of the sympathy of the leaders of the Labour Government for Indian independence—many of them, such as Attlee and Cripps, had had long association with moves for Indian independence and personal experience of the country. Moreover, it was opposed at the time by Churchill—whom Morgenthau repeatedly cites as a 'realist'—and the Conservative opposition, as being an unforced abandonment of British power and interests. The British withdrawal from India is a refutation of Professor Morgenthau's theory in its specific form, in which foreign policy is described as being the 'necessary' pursuit of power,³ and its interpretation in terms of power politics is misleading. If it can be chosen as illustrating some form of Dr Morgenthau's power political theory (because power includes 'bringing commitments into

1. Page 128. 'Of all the factors that make for the power of a nation the most important, however unstable, is the quality of diplomacy.'

2. Professor Morgenthau's definition of power in chapter nine gives some indication of his incorrigibly ambiguous and wide usage of that term (even though his definition does not exhaust his usage). He defines power to include *geography*, *natural resources*, *industrial capacity*, *military preparedness*, *national character*, *population*, *national morale*, *the quality of government*, and the *quality of diplomacy*. See also his footnote on page 25 where he states his belief that the value of the concept power in international politics is determined by its ability to cover as much evidence as possible—i.e. by its ambiguity.

3. See foot-note on page 60.

harmony with resources') then this is indicative of the accommodating ambiguity of the theory, enabling it to cover all conceivable evidence, and not of its high explanatory power.

Similarly Professor Morgenthau describes the prevention of the outbreak of the Greco-Bulgarian War in 1925 as power politics. In attributing the successes of the League of Nations to the power of the Great Powers he states on pages 440-1 that 'in 1925 the incipient war between Bulgaria and Greece was easily stopped by the President of the Council of the League who sent a telegram to the parties demanding the immediate cessation of hostilities. Here he was actively supported by Britain and France, who acted on this occasion in unison and used their influence to deter Greece in particular from offensive action.' The incipient Greco-Bulgarian War of 1925, was stopped when the Greek Government called off a planned attack on Bulgaria at the last instant, on receipt of a telegram from Briand, the President of the League of Nations Council. The telegram was sent on Briand's personal initiative. As the League Council was not in session at the time, Britain and France did not use their influence to dispatch the telegram which stopped the out-break of war. Moreover, as neither of them had any interests in the dispute, there is no reason, on Professor Morgenthau's own theory, why they should have wanted to stop the war. The stopping of the Greco-Bulgarian War refutes Professor Morgenthau's thesis that international affairs cannot be regulated because the 'reality' of the power struggle makes antagonism the 'elemental pattern' of international relations.¹ The interpretation of the stopping of the Greco-Bulgarian War in terms of power politics (because of the influence of Britain and France?) is misleading and reveals that there is nothing that Dr Morgenthau's theory cannot be made to cover, and not that its descriptions are informative.

There is no evidence which Professor Morgenthau cannot and does not interpret as conforming to his theory. It would require many volumes to analyze fully the accommodating ambiguity of Professor Morgenthau's concepts² such as power, interest and the balance

1. See foot-note 4 on page 65.

2. Other typical examples of Professor Morgenthau's incorrigibly wide usage of his concepts, are his descriptions of the disastrous pre-1914 German and Italian colonial policies in terms of national interest on page 86, and of the Crimean War in terms of the balance of power on page 174, while at the same time also attributing the latter to the opportunistic designs of Turkey on page 581. (Page 174. 'The concern of Austria, Great Britain and Russia in the preservation of the Balance of Power in the Balkans was concomitant with the weakening of Turkish power in that region. The Crimean War was fought by an alliance of France, Great Britain, and Turkey against Russia for

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of power. Practically every time he uses these terms, it is with a different connotation and hardly any of his examples of power or the balance of power can be taken out of their contexts and substituted for what is supposed to be another example of the same concept. Some further indication of this accommodating ambiguity and incorrigibly wide interpretation of evidence may be gained from Professor Morgenthau's index. There, under the heading 'balance of power', are 109 references, which are given 56 different descriptions (and this excludes the cross-referencing). Not only is the term 'balance of power' used differently with almost every example, but it is even used differently with regard to the same example (e.g. Germany's unconditional support for Austria in the Balkans in 1914 is described as an attempt to maintain the balance of power on page 174, while exactly the same thing is described as a violation of the balance of power on page 234). The use of concepts such as power, national interest, the balance of power etc. in such a wide variety of different and insubstitutable ways is a sign of the emptiness¹ of the theory and not of its high empirical content.

There is considerable evidence contradicting Professor Morgenthau's theory in its specific form—i.e. in the form from which his message must be principally derived. The relations between the United States and Canada, within the British Commonwealth, between Great Britain and the United States cannot usefully be described as power politics (nor would they become so if Russia did not exist). A mechanistic balance of power as postulated by Professor Morgenthau would require the alliance of Britain with Russia rather than with the United States as this would make the distribution of power between the opposing sides more nearly equal. Foreign policy is not simply an impersonal 'continuum' but varies with different personal assessments and, therefore, with different men and at different times (e.g. the difference of opinion about policy

the purpose of maintaining the Balance of Power in the Balkans.' Page 531. 'Turkey forced the hand of Great Britain and France on the eve of the Crimean War in 1853. The Concert of Europe had virtually agreed upon a compromise when Turkey knowing that the Western Powers would support it in a war with Russia did its best to provoke that war and thus involved Great Britain and France in it against their will . . . Great Britain and France had to accept that decision even though their national interests did not require war with Russia . . .'

1. Page 158. 'The term balance of power is used in the text with four different meanings: (1) as a policy aimed at a certain state of affairs, (2) as an actual state of affairs, (3) as an approximately equal distribution of power, (4) as any distribution of power.'

between Truman and MacArthur during the Korean War; or the change in British policy towards the Ottoman Empire after 1878 which resulted from a changed assessment of Turkey rather than from any decline in her actual power, as witnessed by Salisbury's famous remark of 1897). Nor is international relations merely a Great Power game with the ever increasing influence of the large powers and the decline and existence on sufferance of small states.¹ Consider, for example, the great increase in the number and influence of small independent states since 1945, mainly at the expense of the large colonial powers. Finally the explanation of wars in terms of 'the aspiration for power' divorced from the ends or ideologies about which they were fought and the sacrifices they involved, completely fails to make sense of such wars as the Korean War, the Cold War, the Second World War, the French Revolutionary Wars, the Thirty Years War or the Crusades. Not only have disputes been peacefully settled (e.g. the Greco-Bulgarian dispute) but there have been societies and periods of history free from war.² The thesis that war is the condition of society³ and that attempts to regulate international affairs are 'doomed to failure'⁴ is completely untenable.

Professor Morgenthau's message—and in varying degrees it is the message of most or all the so-called 'realists'—is that we should reconcile or 'accommodate' ourselves to the 'realities' of power

1. Page 164. 'Small nations have always owed their independence to the balance of power . . . or to the preponderance of one protecting power . . . or to their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations.' Morgenthau often contradicts his own description of small nations functioning on sufferance of Great Powers e.g. his description on page 531 of Turkey provoking the Crimean War against the will of Britain and France. See passage quoted in foot-note 2, pp. 63-4 of this article.

2. See 'War', Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Alvin Johnson; or 'A Study of War', Quincy Wright (e.g. page 61).

3. Page 35. 'All history shows that nations active in international politics are continually preparing for, actively involved in or recovering from violence in the form of war.'

4. Page 390. 'This grouping of nations into those in favour of the status quo and those opposed to it is not at all peculiar to the period after the First World War. It is as we know the *elemental pattern* of international politics: as such it recurs in *all periods of history*. Through the antagonism between the status quo and imperialist nations it provides the *dynamics of the historical process*. This antagonism is resolved either in compromise or war. Only under the assumption that the struggle for power might subside or be superseded by a higher principle can collective security have a chance of success. Since, however, nothing in the *reality* of international affairs corresponds to that assumption, the attempt to freeze the particular status quo by means of collective security is in the long run doomed to failure.'

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politics (even though these have always entailed war), pursue opportunistic power or interest policies by authoritarian diplomacy, and not embark upon 'utopian' attempts to reform or regulate international affairs. This message contributes nothing towards the solution of problems in international relations. If the struggle for power were the 'necessary' or 'unalterable' 'reality' of international politics, there would be no option but to reconcile ourselves to this. In this case the books of the so-called 'realists' urging us to do so would be quite unnecessary. If on the other hand international relations are the product of human actions and decisions, and therefore alterable, we should aim at regulating and reforming international affairs, at creating effective international law and institutions and at forcing governments to justify their policies rationally (however unpopular this may be with authoritarian regimes and politicians). The so-called 'realist' injunction to fatalism cannot be justified by an appeal to the 'realities' of international affairs and in so far as this helps to bring about the fulfilment of its own gloomy prophecies, it renders a grave disservice to mankind.¹

THE SEARCH FOR A PHILOSOPHER'S STONE

The theoretical basis of so-called 'realism' rests largely upon an *a priori* untestable assertion that the pursuit of power or interest is the 'reality' of international relations. This uncritical assertion reveals a misunderstanding of the methods of science and makes so-called 'realism' a mystical rather than a scientific theory. It places the truth of the theory on an *a priori* untestable basis, and its empirical claims are the very untestability, which makes the theory vacuous. It gives rise to a theory of grandiose pretensions but little content, and substitutes a pseudo contrast between the alleged 'reality' of so-called 'realism' and the alleged 'utopia' of so-called 'idealism' for the important question of the scientific character or content of the theory. Finally, it attributes the poverty of the theory to the nature of the external world, instead of encouraging a critical examination to see whether it constitutes an ade-

1. The so-called 'realists' also advocate power and interest policies and authoritarian diplomacy as being conducive to peace, a world state (see Morgenthau, Part 10 and quotation cited on page 56, this article) or a better world (G. F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy*, page 100: . . . the pursuit of our national interest can never fail to be conducive to a better world'). This contradicts their advocacy of the same as an accommodation to the 'realities' of power politics and conflict. Moreover, the opportunistic pursuit of power seems more likely to arouse hostility and fear and to create a situation of tension and conflict, than to lead to peace or a better world. This is borne out by Hitler's policy which being authoritarian and opportunistic fits the so-called 'realist' theory closely.

quate and constructive explanation of international relations and the external world.

Science is not a reality. It consists of theories or hypotheses whose truth or reality has to be established by critical experiment or testing. Their truth cannot, therefore, be *known for certain* (for it cannot be known that future tests will not find them wanting) but is *assumed* so long as they have not been refuted. They should be regarded as hypotheses open to testing and, therefore, to change. The truth or reality of the so-called 'realist' theory is not and cannot be established on the basis of critical testing. It is based on the appeal to essentialist laws (such as the 'elemental' law or 'mechanics' of power, the inherent depravity of man or conflict of interests¹), which by their very nature are ultimate and, therefore, in principle not open to testing, refutation and change. The so-called 'realist' theory is, consequently, not a testable hypothesis—i.e. a scientific theory. It is an *a priori* untestable theory whose truth or 'reality' cannot be scientifically established, but is asserted on the basis of mystical or *a priori* untestable laws.

Professor Karl Popper² has shown, in my opinion, that the criterion of the scientific character (i.e. content or informativeness) of a theory is its testability or refutability. Experiments in science are devised in order *severely* to test theories (even in their remote *logical* consequences) and evidence is critically interpreted with a view to finding refutation rather than confirmation (for confirmation can be found for any conceivable theory). So-called 'realism', on the other hand, interprets evidence accommodatingly. It manages to explain all conceivable events in terms of some form of power.³

1. See pages 29-30 and 390 for examples of Morgenthau's use of essentialist or *a priori* untestable laws to explain international relations (e.g. 'elemental pattern', 'elemental biopsychological drives', 'dynamics of the historical process'). For other examples see also R. Niebuhr's description of politics in terms of the 'inevitable selfishness of human nature', in *Moral Man and Immoral Society*. *A priori* untestable explanatory categories are used by all the so-called 'realists' because they mistakenly believe their theories to be (or to objectively describe) an absolute reality—an assumption implicit in the name they give themselves—whereas all theories are subjective descriptions or interpretations of reality requiring critical (i.e. objective or independent) testing.

2. *Logik der Forschung*, Vienna, 1935.

3. The notion of 'power in disguise' is frequently used by the so-called 'realists' in this connection. This (like 'enlightened self-interest') is an *ad hoc* assumption, always capable of saving the power thesis from refutation, and of explaining all conceivable events. For examples of its use see G. Schwarzenberger, *Power Politics* (1961) Part 2 'Power Politics in Disguise'. This notion does not, however, explain why the powerful should need a disguise.

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however implausible and strained this might be (e.g. Morgenthau's Indian and Greco-Bulgarian examples). Its empirical claims are based on the ambiguity or untestability by which it evades refutation and are, therefore, indicative of the emptiness and not of the content of the theory.

The uncritical identification of power politics with 'reality' begs the important question of the informativeness or content of so-called 'realism' and replaces it with a pseudo contrast between two competing mysticisms. Not only is the equation of power or interest with 'reality', and morals or reason with 'utopia' unsound,¹ but the very presentation of a theory of international relations in terms of such a dichotomy is unscientific. It implies the misconception that science requires a unitary all-embracing explanation of international relations,² whereas it consists of manifold and diverse hypotheses each explaining the world in a different aspect. The choice as presented by so-called 'realism' of a 'realistic' or scientific power political theory of international relations and an 'unrealistic' or 'utopian' moralistic-legalistic one is a choice between two alternative unitary and all-embracing explanations or two rival philosophers' stones.³

1. The equation of power with reality leads the so-called 'realists' to a two-alternative classification of policies—i.e. Realistic Power Policies and Unrealistic Moral Policies. As power is not the criterion of the realism of a theory or policy a four-alternative classification of policies would be more satisfactory (not scientific)—i.e. Realistic Power Policies, Realistic Moral Policies, Unrealistic Power Policies, Unrealistic Moral Policies.

2. The assumption that a scientific or realistic explanation of international relations requires one (rather than its alternative) all-embracing theory or explanatory category is implicit or explicit in, I believe, all the so-called 'realists'. For instance on page 3 Morgenthau writes, 'The issue of this theory raises the nature of all politics. The history of modern political thought is the story of a contest between two schools that differ fundamentally in their conceptions of the nature of man and society. One (i.e. idealism) believes that a rational and moral political order derived from universally valid abstract principles can be achieved here now . . . The other (i.e. realism) believes that the world, imperfect as it is from the rational point of view, is the result of *forces inherent in human nature* . . . this being *inherently a world of opposing interests and conflict among them* . . .' Compare also the 'reality'-'utopia' dichotomy in E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years Crisis*.

3. In *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* Morgenthau condemns the construction of scientific theories in international relations yet he constructs one himself, which he claims is scientific or 'realistic'. This is due to his essentialist conception of science, which leads him to condemn theorising, other than his own, on the ground that power not reason is the "essence" or "reality" of international politics. He thus mistakes scientism for science or reason

Science is modest in its claims and impressive in its content. It is highly informative yet its theories or hypotheses are testable, partial (explaining different aspects not all aspects of matter), tentative and open to constant revision. Its prediction is significant and useful but never exact, inevitable or unconditional. The claims of so-called 'realism', on the other hand, are pretentious, while its contributions are minimal. It claims to be 'reality' and is, therefore, in principle untestable, omnipotent and unchangeable (i.e. it excludes the possibility of a different or better 'reality'). It explains all aspects of international relations for all times¹ and all conditions in terms of a single all-embracing explanation, yet it makes no contribution to the solution of any genuine problem in international affairs. Its prediction is absolute, inevitable and infallible,² yet does not enable events to be influenced. Its poverty and fatalism are not due to the intrinsic insolubility of the problems with which it deals but to its a priori untestable self-identification with 'reality'.

Science has produced informative knowledge by looking for the limitations of its theories by critical experiment or testing and logical reasoning, thereby producing ever more informative hypotheses.

and replaces one brand of scientism with another.

The same fallacy accounts for the so-called 'realist' condemnation of reasoning and moralizing about international relations as 'unrealistic', while at the same time they do this themselves (e.g. Morgenthau's Suez article in the New York Times).

1. See Morgenthau's description of the power struggle 'universal in time and space', pages 29-31, quoted in foot-note 1, 'page 61 of this article.

2. So-called 'realism' predicts on the basis of a single *unconditional* or 'historicism' law or 'reality', regardless of the desires or actions of individuals. For instance, Morgenthau's prophecy of the failure of collective security, international law, and institutions, disarmament etc. is on the basis of an unalterable 'elemental pattern' or 'historic process' (see passage from page 390 quoted in foot-note 4, page 65 of this paper). Similarly, Martin Wight explains the groupings of nations unconditionally in terms of the 'mechanics' of the balance of power. *Power Politics* (R.I.I.A. Looking Forward Pamphlets, 1946, e.g. pages 42-3). Scientific prediction requires a law or laws and information about initial conditions. For instance, the prediction of the time it will take to boil water in a kettle requires information about such initial conditions as the quantity of water, the heat of the flame, the thickness of the kettle as well as a law that water boils when heated to a certain temperature. Scientific prediction is, therefore, conditional and enables events to be influenced unlike the predictions of the so-called 'realists' which are historicist and unconditional and, therefore, fatalistic.

Popper's critique of 'historicism', 'essentialism', 'holism' and allied doctrines in 'The Poverty of Historicism' (Economica 1944-5), in my opinion, destroys much of the basis of so-called 'realism' by implication.

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It operates on the assumption of an unknown and infinitely rich world, requiring explanation and regards (or should regard) its knowledge as an awareness of what has been discovered; not as an indication of what is discoverable. So-called 'realism' on the other hand uncritically asserts its 'reality'. It, therefore, admits of no limitations or of any conceivable refutation. It operates on the assumption of a simple known world requiring no further explanation and regards its theory as representing the totality of knowledge and all that is in principle knowable. By disregarding logical reasoning and critical empirical testing it preserves for itself the invulnerability and poverty of its theory.¹ So long as it remains influential there is unlikely to be progress in the scientific study of international relations.

1. Morgenthau, page 8 . . . 'It is no argument against the theory here presented that actual foreign policy does not and cannot live up to it . . . Far from being invalidated by the fact that, for instance, a perfect balance of power will scarcely be found in reality, it starts with the assumption that reality is deficient in this respect.'

THE REPRESENTATIVE REPUBLIC. *Ferdinand A. Hermens.*

University of Notre Dame Press; Notre Dame, Indiana, 1958, 578 pp.

Professor Hermens has set himself the commendable task of showing that constitutional government is not necessarily weak and would be stronger if the importance of political forms were more clearly recognized. The first section of his book is an excursus into political theory, designed to distinguish democracy and constitutionalism from the various forms of tyranny and to make more explicit his concept of political form. The second section traverses analytically the recent history of constitutional government in the United States and western Europe and includes a chapter on the prospects for constitutionalism in India, Indonesia, Malaya, Japan, Greece, and Turkey. In a dust-jacket encomium Dr. Arnold J. Zurcher, of the New York University says of the book: 'Nothing I have read compares with it as respects the extraordinary facility with which the author has woven together traditional knowledge with empirical evidence of a current nature, the sustained high level of discussion, and the extraordinarily readable style'. It would be interesting to see Dr. Zurcher's reading list, for in truth 'The Representative Republic' is a dead duck. The aspiration is a worthy one and the ground-plan of the book is sensible, but it has to be said that Professor Hermens has attempted something beyond his capacities. To say this is not necessarily to put a low rating on those capacities. But the task of estimating the extent to which political action is governed on the one hand by political forms and on the other by underlying social and economic conditions (if, indeed, the two are strictly separable) is one which requires above everything a subtle and mature mind and a gift for delicacy and precision of utterance. These are not Professor Hermens's qualities. He has immense industry, encyclopaedic reading, and a considerable gift for organizing his material. But the book does not come alive. His accounts of constitutional government in France and Italy, for instance, rely on the right authorities (with a few remarkable omissions) and discuss the right issues, but the sureness of touch that would make them more than a careful assembling of materials is not there. Professor Hermens's treatment of French constitutionalism might be compared with Philip Williams's *Politics in Post-War France*—which, strangely enough, does not appear in his references.

Professor Hermens's treatment of constitutional democracy in western Europe might be satisfactory for, say, university students embarking on a course in comparative politics; but as a foundation for a discussion of the influence of political forms on political action it is inadequate. The consequences of this inadequacy are most apparent in Professor Hermens's generalizations on the relationship between voting systems and the structuring and activities of political parties. The work of Duverger has provoked a substantial literature on this subject, and those who are familiar with this literature will find Professor Hermens somewhat thin. Unfortunately, the lack of depth in the empirical parts of his book is not counterbalanced by caution in making judgments. Thus, in his summing up of political prospects in the non-European countries he waves aside as 'incurable romanticism' the idea that there might develop distinctively Asian (or African) forms of democracy, and says:

'In all of these discussions it would be well to bear in mind two basic facts: first, that human beings in Asia (or Africa) are the same as human

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beings in what we call the Western world; second, that the social changes now operating in Asia, Africa, and Latin America are all related, directly or indirectly, to the same cause, the rise of modern industrialism, and are likely to lead to the same results.'

This generalization, typical of many, has an important truth behind it, but as it stands it is so over-simplified as to be almost meaningless. Equally confident, and equally unsatisfying, are Professor Hermens's generalizations about 'economic nationalism' in the underdeveloped Asian countries. E.g.: 'The first step in economic modernization is bound to be the hardest; if it is taken successfully, more rapid progress will come automatically, provided it is not blocked by artificial barriers.' If this means what I think it means, Professor Hermens is well away from the mark, and what makes this a little surprising is his professed reliance, at this point in his book, on Gunnar Myrdal.

It remains to add that the book bears marks of haste—frequent misspellings and much obscure and clumsy prose.

L. C. Webb

JAPAN AND HER DESTINY—MY STRUGGLE FOR PEACE.

Mamoru Shigemitsu. Hutchinson; 1958, 392 pp.

The author is not to blame for the pretentious title. That is the work of the editor of the English language edition and the translator. Mr. Shigemitsu had chosen *Showa no Doran* as the title of the Japanese version, which was first published in Tokyo in April 1952, in fact a few days before the Japanese Peace Treaty came into effect. *Showa no Doran* is, literally, 'The Upheaval(s) of the Showa Era', but it was thought that this title would have little appeal abroad. Whether the new title is a sufficient draw card to make up for the deficiencies of this somewhat pedestrian and pathetic story is doubtful. Mr. Shigemitsu, in compiling his account of the events of his times which led to the downfall of Japan, has clearly relied heavily upon Japanese Foreign Office papers on current events. It is not that he does not acknowledge this, but the non-committal bureaucratic flatness of much of this record robs it of any lively quality, which one might expect from the account of a participant, and, except for the few pages dealing with the closing stages of the Pacific War, there is little of his own recollection of events that adds to our knowledge of what must go down in history as one of the great paradoxes—that an era known as the era of enlightened peace (Showa) should have been so much taken up with unenlightened war. Shigemitsu, who was either an Ambassador, Vice-Minister, or Minister for Foreign Affairs during most of this period, assigns the responsibility for this state of affairs where it rightly belongs, firstly to the Japanese Army and Navy, and secondly to those in the Japanese Government who did nothing to check the extremists, more particularly Prince Konoye for not standing up to the Army at the proper time. Of Konoye he says: 'As a member of the aristocratic circle most intimate with the Court, he was esteemed by all classes, high and low. Surely such a man was not cast to be the puppet of the militarists; he himself at all events did not think it. And yet that is just the grave responsibility that he must bear. He did in fact become the puppet of the Army'. This is a fairly generally accepted view now, but is it fair to Konoye? Others played along with the Army, because it was 'inevitable' or 'unavoidable'. One must remember that in those days it was something of an achievement for a Japanese Prime Minister to remain alive. Was Konoye any worse, for example, than those who, today, for fear of personal reprisals or fear of having the minds of others poisoned against them, finally give up the struggle in defence of the liberal conscience and retire to the ivory tower?

Though there is no reason to doubt Shigemitsu's own sincerity in claiming to oppose the Army as to their means, he was, at many times, at one with them as to ends. However, Shigemitsu does not set out quite so deliberately to whitewash himself, as does his translator. There is firstly the interpolated title *My Struggle for Peace*, and, from time to time, glosses in the text which are unfortunate. For example, commenting upon the outbreak of the China War, Shigemitsu says, 'The Government made up its mind to localize the affair—and magnified it! Both the Government and the Army declared this to be a "sacred war of retribution on China". The Premier advocated a "New Order in East Asia".' The exclamation mark is the translator's, while

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an additional comment of Shigemitsu—'When things had come to such a pass, there was no way of preventing it'—has been omitted. In effect, the original text is not as critical in tone as the translation.

The value of Shigemitsu's book appearing at this time is that it underlines what should now be better known than it is, namely that unrestrained Machiavellianism, practised in peace time leads inevitably to war, and, practised in war leads ultimately to defeat. Shigemitsu's book, in so far as it illustrates this is of particular value, but as a defence it is a sad record of the confused thinking and shilly-shallying of a decent man carried away by the enormity of the complexities that surrounded him. Out of it all these pointers appear. They should be in heavy type as a warning to diplomats everywhere. On page 117 Shigemitsu says: 'The Government left the matter to the Army. It seemed in fact to prefer not to know'. And again on page 125:

'In foreign diplomacy also the Army and Navy adopted their own particular interpretation of the rules. In any question in which the Supreme Command was involved, they were independent of the control of the Ambassador or Minister, and any officer sent on a mission insisted on negotiating direct. Military and Naval Attachés have, by diplomatic usage, diplomatic privilege, but it is understood that they are acting under the supervision and responsibility of the Ambassador or Minister. But Japanese Attachés, except at ceremonial functions, carried on their duties as though they were independent. They communicated directly with their central authorities. It was as though they had no relationship with the envoy. The Ambassador or Minister did not even know what they were negotiating, unless the attache or the person with whom he was negotiating told him. Moreover the scope of their duties was determined by the Army or Navy alone and that scope naturally tended to grow until it included the gravest political questions. In Japan there were now two Governments—the Supreme Command (General Staff) and the Cabinet, each exercising diplomatic functions independently. There was no co-ordination in the will of the country, which spoke with two voices. What could result but disaster?'

The Allied Powers, full of reforming zeal went into Japan to sweep all of this away, but the work has not yet been completed. Trickery and deception have an appeal to the minds of men which it is hard to eradicate, and Machiavellian intrigue plays a prominent part in the activities of major and minor powers.

Revelations made by Petrov and others showed that the U.S.S.R. inherited Secret Police and kindred organisations from the Czarist regime. The Germans inherited theirs from the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Britain has had her Bulldog Drummonds. The Chinese and the Japanese are past masters in the stealthy arts, while in the Central Intelligence Agency, the United States has the most widely publicised covert organisation in the world. In the atmosphere created by all of these operators it is impossible to attain even the beginnings of that foundation of good faith which is essential to the establishment of an ordered world society that has some prospect of survival.

In drawing attention once more to the evils of dual diplomacy Mamoru Shigemitsu has done a final service not only to Japan, but to all nations.

T. W. Eckersley

SOCIALISM IN ONE COUNTRY 1924-1926. Volume I. E. H. Carr.

Macmillan, 1958, pp. viii + 557. Australian price 64/9.

It is now eight years since Professor Oakeshott, in reviewing the first volume of *A History of Soviet Russia*, complained that 'Mr Carr's account of the Bolshevik Revolution falls short of genuine history . . . We are present, it appears, not at a reformation or a revolution, but at the creation of a world *ex nihilo* by a demi-urge who came from Switzerland . . . Russia before the revolution is not allowed to enter in detail into the story of the revolution: it was merely non-contributory. Perhaps it is too early to make this complaint, perhaps in subsequent volumes Mr Carr will provide what is omitted from this: nevertheless it is an omission here which most readers will regret'. In the first part of the present volume (which is the fifth volume of *A History of Soviet Russia*) Mr Carr does seek to rectify the omission not, of course, by retracing his earlier narrative (which is, perhaps, what Oakeshott would require) but by providing an analytical discussion of the interaction between the forces of tradition and of innovation in post-revolutionary Russia. His emphasis on the importance of tradition is now as great as Oakeshott—or even Berdyaev—could want. 'As the Soviet Government became more and more openly the heir of Russian state power and attracted to itself traditional feelings of Russian patriotism, it proclaimed its mission in terms which conveyed to sensitive ears unmistakable echoes of the Russian past . . . The fulfilment of the eschatological promises of Marxism was delayed, like the Second Advent, far beyond the original expectations of the faithful; and, when this delay bred the inevitable current compromises with power and expediency, the process of degeneration from the pure ideal took on specifically Russian forms in a Russian context. Primitive Christianity decked itself in the trappings of imperial Rome, communism in those of the Russian national state' (p. 21).

The coalescence of Russian tradition and of Bolshevik innovation is worked out in some detail by reference to the position in the early 1920's of The Family, The Orthodox Church, Literature and Law (Chapter 2) and Class and Party (Chapter 3). Chapter 4 provides brief biographical sketches of the leading personalities of the period—Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Buharin and Stalin—and attempts to interpret their activities and influence in terms of the old and the new in Soviet Russia. The defeat of Trotsky is connected with his being a 'wholehearted and impenitent Westerner'; the victory of Stalin with his non-Western, distinctively Russian outlook.

Despite the importance that Carr places on the legacy of history he remains alive to the necessity of explaining the revolutionary energy which, after the lull of NEP, was again to be released with the introduction of full-scale planning and collectivization. The prime source of the continuing revolutionary spirit, he argues, was the party considered, not (as Marxist theory would require) as the representative of dominant economic and social forces, but as a political force in its own right. 'The dictatorship of the proletariat was a political, not an economic or social, phenomenon: it was the rule not of a class, but of a party or group.' (p. 134) . . . 'The party leadership compromised by far enough with traditional society to ride the storm; this compromise was the essence not only of NEP, but of socialism in one country. Yet in the sequel it had retained its revolutionary dynamic unimpaired, and imposed on the society the consummation of "revolution from above". This was

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a political *dénouement* which constitutes a striking tribute to the infinite complexity of the factors that determine the course of history' (p. 136). This also, it might be added, was the political *dénouement* which disproved the Marxist account of revolution in general and which demonstrated that the Bolshevik Revolution was in no sense a Marxist or proletarian revolution. Carr, however, is reluctant to concede the latter point. The hypertrophy of the party, he admits, was 'a direct outcome of the isolated victory of the proletarian revolution in a country whose retarded economic and political development failed to provide the conditions postulated by Marx and by early Marxists for such a victory.' (p. 135) Nevertheless he seems to think that, inasmuch as the Party remained devoted to the ideal of rapid industrialization and a gradually rising standard of living for workers, it can be said to have effected a proletarian revolution. On these criteria, however, capitalism could also be said to have been engaged in proletarian revolution well before 1917.

The second and longer part of Volume I of *Socialism in One Country* is devoted to a detailed description of economic conditions between 1924 and early 1926 in Agriculture (Chapter 5), Industry (Chapter 6), Labour (Chapter 7), Internal and Foreign Trade (Chapter 8), Finance and Credit (Chapter 9). The theme running through each of the chapters is the clash between the principles of NEP and the principles of planned industrialization. Carr shows that by the end of 1925 the eventual victory of the planners had become inevitable and the last chapter of the book is appropriately devoted to an extremely interesting account of the development of planning up till that time.

Two further volumes are to be devoted to the theme of *Socialism in One Country*. Volume II, which should appear this year, will deal with political developments and Volume III with external relations. With their appearance our knowledge of the origins of Stalinism should be wider and sounder.

B. D. Beddie

A HISTORY OF SOCIALIST THOUGHT: VOLUME IV: COMMUNISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY 1914-31. G. D. H. Cole. (In two parts: pp. x + 940), Macmillan, 1958. Australian price 75/6.

Macmillan's pleasantly produced volumes of Cole's *History*, with some 2700 pages of text, have now brought the story to the Depression. Cole's intention is to round out this encyclopaedic survey (to 1945 or so) in a final Volume—though it, like its two predecessors, will doubtless run to two parts and so complete the whole work in eight solid tomes.

In general, the treatment in the present two parts, which cover the years 1914-1931, parallels that in Volume III. Of the thirty chapters, seven (placed strategically amongst the rest) deal with international aspects such as the international social congresses during World War I and the post-war rivalry of the socialist and communist internationals. The remaining twenty-three chapters deal with particular countries in the proportions: Russia 4, Germany 3, Britain 2, the rest of Europe 8, Asia 3, the Americas 2 and Australasia 1—though a reckoning by pages would show an even greater (but probably still justifiable) European preponderance. Australia is dealt with in 8 pages.

A large element in our interest in Volume IV derives from the fact that it tells of years and events Cole knew at first hand and ideas of which he was an active protagonist or critic and opponent. This gives special value to the introductory chapter where he recalls his own positions at various dates in the period under survey. In subsequent chapters Cole's current attitudes to various aspects of Communism seem at times ambivalent and sometimes over-indulgent for a social democrat with such a mastery of the history of socialism.

At more than one point Cole notes the absence during 1914-31 of new and fresh theoretical works in the socialist (and particularly the social-democratic) camp. It will astonish no one, then, that in this Volume—contrary to his expressed intent in the Introduction to Volume I—Cole focuses on the Socialist and Communist movements and parties much of the time. This trend, noticeable in Volume III, is now most pronounced. It makes Volume IV no less interesting and valuable—indeed, it would have been remarkable after a hundred years of socialist agitation and democratic advance if much of the interest had not shifted to Socialist movements and struggles.

When Cole comes to some of the marginal countries (countries marginal both to the Socialist Movement and to his personal experience and knowledge) his chapters become less impressive. The reason is not far to seek in regard to the eight pages on Australia. There is little as yet published which really documents or illuminates the Australian Socialist and Labour scene for the period 1914-31. Moreover, though his Preface acknowledges help (extent undefined) from Dr Lloyd Ross, his bibliography cites no Australian publication later than 1947—most items listed are definitely older still. There are no references to post-war books on the Labour Movement and, naturally enough, Cole has seen little of the steadily growing bulk of unpublished research and thesis work.

Significantly, too, his bibliographical note on Australia commences: 'For Australia the most useful source is B. Fitzpatrick's *Short History of the Australian Labour Movement* (revised, 1944); and see also his *The British*

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Empire in Australia 1834-1939, (1941). Refer also to E. W. Campbell, *History of the Australian Labour Movement*. He then goes on to list 'background' items.

If Campbell's booklet, in particular, has been regarded as a major guide, one can hardly be astonished to read of the 1921 Socialisation Objective of the A.L.P. the sweeping assertion that it 'certainly did nothing to reconcile the antagonisms between the Labour politicians and the mainly industrial left-wing, which passed increasingly under Communist influence', while after 1929 some Communist parliamentary candidates were 'polling largely'. Apart from a passing reference to child endowment there is no review of the advances achieved by the first Lang Government in New South Wales, no reference to the fascinating relationships between Lang and at least some of the powerful industrial Left, no real examination of the Ryan-Theodore-McCormack hegemony in Queensland.

There is no question of quarrelling seriously with that part of Cole's conclusion which reads: 'In effect, Australia contributed practically nothing during these years to socialist thinking . . . Not a single Socialist book or pamphlet of any real significance was published during the period under review, unless we are to take account of V. Gordon Childe's highly critical study, *How Labour Governs*'. Yet there is surely still room for some consideration of the ideas, derivative though they may largely be, of the dominant elements in the Labour Movement. Were they based on Sidney Webb's 1918 Fabianism? Were they, or to what extent were they, influenced by the early Soviet concepts and institutions? Cole makes no attempt to analyse the cross-currents at the 1921 Congress and Conference, the concepts of socialism of the sponsors of the 1921 Objective, or the nature and extent of the retreat at subsequent Federal A.L.P. Conferences (notably that of 1927) from the 1921 position. Nor does he broach the whole question of the effect of Federalism and a federal environment on socialism and the socialists.

In any subsequent printing there are a few corrections of detail which should be made in the Australian section. 'Supreme Court' should read 'High Court'. The voting figures for 'No' in the 1916 Conscription referendum are, by a slip or misprint, 100,000 short. It is implied that the Nationalist Party emerged immediately upon Hughes' break with the A.L.P.

In conclusion, however, it must be stressed that the rather less than satisfactory Australian sections of Volumes III and IV are as peripheral to the whole work as the Australian Labour Movement was to International Socialism. Our central judgment must be of the international and European chapters of this work, for which we can all be unreservedly grateful. Students, in particular, will be deeply in Cole's debt for his distilling so concisely and lucidly so vast and perplexing a mass of material.



The foregoing review was completed a month before Cole's death in London at the age of 69. Whether we shall see the final volume of the *History of Socialist Thought* is not known here at present.

It would not be fitting to go to press, however, without adding a word of tribute to Douglas Cole's life and work. Those of us who knew him as

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teacher and friend at Oxford will always retain most vivid memories of his gracious, brilliant and stimulating qualities. His contribution to the development of social studies in that University was outstanding. Only Margaret, his wife and collaborator, and a few intimate friends could enumerate the many institutions and causes, British and international, to which he made solid, creative contributions as he drove his frail body to support his relentless mind and spirit. As an author of topical and scholarly books and articles he did more than almost anyone in his generation to create the intellectual climate in which our generation of political scientists and of Labour men grew up.

Socialism for Douglas Cole was more than a political and economic doctrine: it was a way of personal and social life. Unless it was at once humane, humanistic and international it was not socialism. He himself—in some ways the most 'English' of Englishmen—was a deeply sincere international socialist to whom democratic socialists of all countries were truly 'comrades', whose joint efforts could make a new world.

L. F. Crisp.



